MANAGING RISK ON A $25 MILLION BET: VENTURE CAPITAL,
AGENCY COSTS AND THE FALSE DICHOTOMY OF THE CORPORATION
Robert P. Bartlett, III*
Abstract:
An implicit dichotomy of the corporation exists in legal scholarship. On one
side of the dichotomy rests the publicly-held corporation suffering from a
significant conflict of interest between its managers and dispersed shareholders; on
the other side, the closely-held corporation plagued by inter-shareholder conflict.
This Article argues that understanding the agency problems that can exist
within a firm demands a rejection of this traditional dichotomy and the theories of
the firm built upon it. Using venture capital finance, this Article demonstrates for
the first time how this dichotomy obscures how all firms—public and private—
often face the same agency problems. Companies receiving venture capital (VC)
investment are uniquely situated to examine this dichotomy, as they represent
closely-held firms structured to transition quickly to public equity markets.
Additionally, by separating investment from company management, VC investment
creates many of the investor-manager conflicts inherent in public companies.
By analyzing VC investment contracts, this Article reveals that start-up
companies are indeed plagued by both “vertical” agency problems between
investors and managers and “horizontal” agency problems among VC investors
themselves. Significantly, academic scholarship has ignored the potential for interinvestor conflicts, using instead an analytical framework associated with public
corporations that focuses exclusively on investor-manager agency problems. In so
doing, VC scholarship provides a clear example of how the dichotomy of the
corporation forces scholars to wear blinders in analyzing the agency problems in
firms. To understand the full scope of these problems—and their implication for
corporate investors—a new model of the firm is required that applies to all firms,
public and private. This Article outlines this model and articulates its implications
for corporate investors, corporate scholars and corporate law in general.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1999, two venture capital firms invested $25 million in a newlyformed Internet search firm called Google. Four years later, after its initial
public offering, their investment was worth over $4 billion.1 Yet not every
company is a Google. Consider, for example, another $25 million
investment made by prominent venture capital firm Benchmark Capital. Its
investment in Juniper Financial Corp., originally made during the “dot-com
bubble” in 2000, ultimately resulted in a well-publicized and futile lawsuit
by Benchmark against Juniper and a co-investor in the company when
Juniper consummated a transaction that effectively destroyed the value of
Benchmark’s investment.2 The challenge for investors is how best to
manage risk in a world of uncertainty, where the $25 million bet could turn
out to be a Google or a Juniper Financial.
1
2

See Bob Sechler, Web-Search Sector Lures Venture Fires, WALL ST. J., Feb. 15, 2006, at B3B.
See Lisa Bransten, Benchmark Capital Sues Company It Nurtured, WALL ST. J., July 11, 2002, at C5.
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Not surprisingly, analysis of the structural risks of corporate investment
is a foundational issue for legal and financial scholars—but one in which
context matters. Ask a corporate scholar to describe the structural
investment risks for a publicly-held corporation, and you will undoubtedly
hear about the significant conflicts of interest that exist between a
corporation’s managers and its dispersed shareholders.3 Ask the same about
a closely-held corporation, and be prepared for an analysis about the
potential for inter-shareholder conflicts.4 There are, in short, two
“corporations” in modern corporate scholarship: one public, one private.5 A
peculiar result given that—for all practical purposes—our corporation
statutes envision but one corporation.6
The thesis of this Article is that an accurate understanding of corporate
investment risk demands the rejection of this traditional dichotomy of the
corporation and the theories of the firm built upon it. Using venture capital
finance, this Article demonstrates for the first time how this dichotomy
obscures how all firms—public and private—frequently face the same
structural investment risks. Indeed, only by constructing a model of the
firm that ignores this false dichotomy can we recognize the full scope of
investment risks that affect firms of any mold.
Start-up companies7 receiving venture capital (VC) investment are
uniquely situated to examine this dichotomy, as they exist at a cross-roads
3

See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi, Law, Finance, and Path Dependence: Developing Strong Securities Markets,
80 TEX. L. REV. 1657, 1659 (2002) (“A well-known agency problem exists between managers and
dispersed shareholders of public corporations.”); see also infra TAN 23-33 & 245-247.
4
See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations
of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1745 (2001) (“[I]t is widely recognized that participants in
closely held corporations face a high risk of loss from their fellow participants’ opportunism…”); see
also infra TAN 256-258.
5
See John C. Coates, IV, Measuring the Domain of Mediating Hierarchy: How Contestable Are U.S.
Public Corporations?, 24 J. CORP. L. 837, 840 (1999). The literature comparing private and public
corporations has made clear that the fundamental difference between the two relates to these differing
dimensions of structural investment risk. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close
Corporations and Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L. REV. 271, 277-83 (1986) (describing as the “fundamental
difference” the investor-manager conflicts created by the separation of risk bearing and management in
publicly-held firms and the inter-shareholder conflicts created by its unification in closely-held firms);
Blair & Stout, supra note 4, at 1735 (2001) (noting that “closely held corporations generally do not
suffer the ‘separation of ownership and control’ thought to plague publicly held firms … [but] are
famous for presenting their own problems … in the form of opportunistic behavior between
shareholders.”); Lucian Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Optimal Defaults for Corporate Law Evolution, 96
NW. U. L. REV. 489, 495-96 (2002) (describing the “agency problem associated with the inherent
conflict of interests between managers and shareholders of public corporations” which represents a
“different problem[] than those posed by close corporations”).
6
See Coates, supra note 5, at 840 (“[D]efault corporate law has only erratically and incompletely
distinguished between [close corporations and public corporations].”) Although many states provide
special close corporation statutes, they are systematically underutilized by close corporations. See
generally Tara Wortman, Unlocking Lock-In: Limited Liability Companies and the Key to
Underutilization of Close Corporation Statutes, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1362, 1381-86 (1995).
7
This Article uses the term “start-up company” to refer to any business organization receiving VC
financing. Although any business entity may receive VC financing, for a variety of technical reasons,
most VC investors prefer to invest in corporations. See JACK LEVIN, STRUCTURING VENTURE CAPITAL,
PRIVATE EQUITY AND ENTREPRENEURIAL TRANSACTIONS 9 (1999).
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between private and public firms. VC investments are made in private
companies developing new businesses with the goal of moving these
companies to public equity markets either through an initial public offering
(“IPO”) or an acquisition by a publicly-traded corporation. Additionally, by
separating risk-bearing investment from day-to-day company management,
VC investment creates many of the agency problems faced by investors in
public corporations. In this regard, they represent a logical starting point for
examining how a firm can experience both the inter-shareholder conflicts
typically associated with private companies as well as the investor-manger
conflicts typically associated with public companies.
At the same time, the academic literature on VC investment provides a
clear example of how the implicit dichotomy of corporate scholarship
obscures an accurate understanding of investment risk. The significant
investor-manager conflicts created by VC investment have led corporate
scholars to apply an analytical framework to VC finance that is generally
associated with analyses of public corporations. For over twenty-five years,
scholarly analyses of VC investment have been based on a simple, standard
model of VC investment that has focused exclusively on the conflicts of
interest that exist between VC investors and company managers. Informed
in large part by the agency costs theory of the firm introduced in 1976 by
Michael Jensen and William Meckling, 8 the model focuses on the
significant information asymmetries and agency risks that exist between a
firm’s investors and its managers and the mechanisms VC investors use to
minimize the resulting “agency costs.”9
Notably absent from discussions of VC investment are considerations of
how start-up companies also suffer the types of shareholder-shareholder
conflicts that have historically plagued closely-held firms. Of particular
8
See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
9
This model of VC investment can be found in virtually any academic discussion of VC finance. See,
e.g.,William Sahlman, The Structure and Governance of Venture Capital Organizations, 27 J. FIN.
ECON. 473, 473 (1990) (“The venture-capital industry has evolved operating procedures and contracting
practices that are well adapted to environments characterized by uncertainty and information
asymmetries between principals and agents.”); Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market:
Lessons from the American Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1069 (2003) (“[T]he keystone of the
U.S. venture capital market is private ordering—the contracting structure that developed to manage the
extreme uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency costs that inevitably bedevil early-stage, hightechnology financing.”); D. Gordon Smith, Venture Capital Contracting In The Information Age, 2 J.
SMALL & EMERGING BUS . L. 133, 138 (1998)(“Most subsequent scholarship has followed Sahlman’s
lead, viewing venture capital contracts exclusively as mechanisms for reducing potential agency costs to
venture capitalists.”); Steven Kaplan and Per Strömberg, Characteristics, Contracts, and Actions:
Evidence from Venture Capital Analyses, 59 J. FIN. 2177, 2178 (2004) (“The theories [on VC finance]
predict that characteristics of VC contracts will be related to the extent of agency problems [with
entrepreneurs].”); PAUL A. GOMPERS & J OSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE 158 (2004)
(describing the problems faced by investors given the degree of asymmetric information between VC
investors and entrepreneurs concerning a start-up company). For a concise summary of the literature,
see generally Michael Klausner & Kate Litvak, What Economists Have Taught Us About Venture
Capital Contracting, in BRIDGING THE ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCING G AP: LINKING G OVERNANCE
WITH REGULATORY POLICY at 55-69 (Michael Whincop ed., 2001).
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significance for start-up companies are conflicts among VC investors
themselves. Studies of VC investment utilizing the traditional “agency
cost” model commonly assume either a single VC investor or a
homogenized group of VC firms to simplify their analysis of management
agency risk. 10 Yet, as this Article demonstrates, VC investments are made
jointly by investors whose economic interests often clash. Paradoxically, it
is the very techniques investors use to minimize potential agency risk with
company managers that create the potential for these inter-investor
conflicts.
To minimize manager agency risk, VC investors undertake a number of
strategies in making company investments, including the acquisition of
control and monitoring rights, the staging of investments through “rounds”
of financing and the syndication of investments with other VC investors.11
Although much has been written about these strategies, little has been said
about an important practical consequence of them—these strategies cause
investors to acquire a company’s securities at different times and different
prices. This simple fact of VC investment, when combined with the
compensation structure of most VC funds, can lead to significantly
divergent preferences among a company’s investors concerning the
company and its transactions. The divergence of preferences is particularly
acute with regard to the timing of an “exit” event (such as an IPO or an
acquisition) and the company’s future financing. Aware of these potential
conflicts, a VC investor negotiates specific economic and control rights with
a start-up company and its other investors to protect these preferences when
making an investment. These contractual provisions, however, only
accentuate the potential for inter-investor conflict by driving a wedge
between the economic interests of the company’s investors. Consequently,
a company’s VC investors will often have both the incentive and the means
to engage in rent-seeking behavior vis-à-vis other investors in certain
economic contexts.
Thus, to truly understand VC investment, it is essential to move beyond
the traditional analytical frameworks used in corporate scholarship.
Specifically, understanding VC investment requires a model of the firm that
accounts for at least two forms of potential agency risk: the “vertical”
agency risk posed by the delegation of corporate authority to unrelated
managers and the “horizontal” agency risk posed by the significant control
rights held by other investors. To be sure, this insight echoes those such as
Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout who have likewise noted the inadequacies of
the traditional principal-agent paradigm of the public corporation. Blair and
10

For instance, even where VC firms are recognized as collectively investing in a start-up company,
their interests appear unified and aligned. See, e.g., Steven Kaplan and Per Strömberg, Financial
Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts, 70 REV
ECON. STUD. 281, 283 (2003) (“It is beyond the scope of this paper to consider agency problems among
VC syndicates. Given the repeated nature of syndications, we believe it is reasonable to aggregate
holdings and assume that the VCs in each round act to maximize value.”).
11
See infra Part II(A).
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Stout’s “team production” model rightfully expands the analytical
framework by considering the full range of inter-stakeholder conflicts that
exist within a firm (e.g., shareholder vs. managers, shareholder vs.
bondholder, etc.).12 Their model, however, is expressly limited to public
firms and stops short of considering the possibility for intra-stakeholder
conflicts such as those that so critically shape VC investment. Moreover,
their team production model continues to view agency problems as
essentially stable and concrete. 13 Yet as VC investment demonstrates, these
problems are commonly dynamic and evolving; it is the very attempt by
investors to manage investor-manager agency risk that creates a second
dimension of agency risk among investors themselves. By analyzing the
agency problems in VC finance, this Article therefore lays the groundwork
for a new model of the firm that incorporates the dynamic formation of both
inter-stakeholder and intra-stakeholder conflicts and applies to all firms,
public and private. Figure 1 sets forth this “dynamic agency cost model” as
it applies to VC investment.
Figure 1: Traditional and Dynamic Agency Cost Models of VC Investment
Traditional Agency Cost Model
VC Firm A
Inter-Stakeholder Conflicts:
Potential VC-Manager
Conflicts
Start-Up
Company

Dynamic Agency Cost Model
Intra-Stakeholder Conflicts:
Potential VC-VC Conflicts
VC Firm A

VC Firm A

VC Firm B

Inter-Stakeholder Conflicts:
Potential VC-Manager
Conflicts
Start-Up
Company

Round of Financing

1st Round

Start-Up
Company

2nd Round

A dynamic agency cost model provides more than just a better
descriptive account of the potential agency problems in a firm. As a matter
of corporate finance, it provides a significantly more robust means with
which to analyze the non-systematic risks of corporate investment.
12
For a general description of Blair and Stout’s team production theory, see Margaret M. Blair & Lynn
A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999).
13
See infra TAN 252-253.
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Financial contracting theory tells us that when faced with non-systematic
risk such as agency risk, rational investors should respond by contracting
against it or discounting the value of the investment.14 Thus, in the context
of VC investment, much of the academic scholarship has sought to develop
formal models describing how VC investors can best address investormanager agency risk in VC investment. 15 Yet given the reality of both
investor-manager and inter-investor agency risk, the traditional agency cost
model’s focus on “vertical” agency risk with managers necessarily provides
us with an incomplete understanding of how VC investors should price and
structure VC investments. The dynamic agency cost model remedies this
limitation by providing a framework that accounts for the full scope of
agency risk in VC investment. As such, it provides the proper starting point
for practitioners and scholars alike for analyzing how to plan successful VC
investments and, more generally, how we can develop efficient VC
economies. That business and contract scholars tend to draw lessons from
VC contracting further strengthens the need for an accurate understanding
of this important area of corporate finance.16
For similar reasons, the model permits a much more nuanced
understanding of how investors actually use financial contracts to address
company-specific investment risk. Just as the traditional analytical
frameworks have worked to obscure the scope of agency risks within a firm,
they have likewise worked to limit academic analysis of how investors use
financial contracts to control these risks. Once again, VC scholarship
provides a ready example. An impressive body of scholarship now exists
that seeks to present a positive account of how VC investors draft VC
14

See AMIR BARNEA, AGENCY PROBLEMS AND FINANCIAL CONTRACTING 2 (1985).
See, e.g., Francesca Cornelli & Oved Yosha, Stage Financing and the Role of Convertible Securities,
24 REV. ECON. STUD. 126 (2003) (financial model demonstrating optimal use of convertible securities to
minimize management “window dressing” of corporate performance); Klaus Schmidt, Convertible
Securities and Venture Capital Finance, 58 J. FIN. 1139 (2003) (financial model demonstrating optimal
use of convertible securities to induce efficient investment by entrepreneurs and VC investors); Thomas
Hellman, The Allocation of Control Rights in Venture Capital Contracts, 29 RAND J. ECON. 57 (1998)
(financial model demonstrating optimal use of VC control rights to protect against entrepreneur holdups); Dirk Bergemann & Ulrich Hege, Venture Capital Financing, Moral Hazard, and Learning, 22 J.
BANK. FIN. 703 (1998) (financial model demonstrating optimal mixture of debt and equity to address
moral hazard risks posed by entrepreneurs); Anat Admati & Paul Pfleiderer, Robust Financial
Contracting and the Role of Venture Capitalists, 49 J. FIN. 371 (1994) (financial model demonstrating
optimal use of “fixed fraction contracts” to resolve agency problems between VC investors and
entrepreneurs); Erik Berglöf, A Control Theory of Venture Capital Finance, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 247
(1994) (financial model demonstrating optimal contract design to mitigate investor-manager conflicts of
interest).
16
For instance, the success of VC firms in constructing a system of private ordering with few disputes
has led commentators to suggest reform in other legal areas ranging from bankruptcy, see Douglas Baird
& Robert Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 751, 777-788 (2002), to close
corporations, see Shannon Wells Stevenson, The Venture Capital Solution to the Problem of Close
Corporation Shareholder Fiduciary Duties, 51 DUKE L.J. 1139 (2001). Studies of how to develop
venture capital markets overseas have likewise focused on the need to replicate American-style VC
contracts to develop efficient VC economies. See, e.g., Gilson, supra note 9; Haksoo Ko, Venture
Capital in Korea? Special Law to Promote Venture Capital Companies, 15 AM. U. I NT'L L. REV. 457,
459-462 (2000).
15
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contracts to protect themselves against investor-manager agency risk. 17
Viewing VC contracts through the lens of the dynamic agency cost model,
however, we can see that real-life VC contracts are about much more than
controlling investor-manager conflicts—they are also about controlling
potential inter-investor conflicts. This perspective allows us to analyze for
the first time characteristics of VC contracting that have previously been
ignored in VC scholarship. By focusing on investor-manager conflicts, the
traditional agency costs model lacks the capacity to explain—indeed, even
recognize—these prominent features of VC contracting that arise due to the
potential for agency problems among investors. Likewise, the dynamic
model permits a fresh look at the reasons for and the effect of many
common provisions of VC contracts that are distinct from traditional agency
cost explanations.
In this regard, the model provides a new perspective on one of the most
persistent questions in the academic literature on VC finance: why do VC
investors routinely invest in preferred stock despite its numerous
disadvantages?18 To date, the large literature on this subject has generally
focused on preferred stock’s advantageous tax characteristics and its
capacity for aligning the interests of managers and VC investors.19 Using
the dynamic agency cost model, this Article presents another important but
overlooked advantage: preferred stock makes it easier for VC investors to
manage contractually inter-investor conflicts. In this light, a long-held
corporate doctrine requiring a narrow construction of preferred stock rights
presents a troubling problem for efficient VC investment. This doctrine
significantly impairs VC investors’ ability to use preferred stock to
minimize inter-investor agency problems, leaving VC investors little choice
but to increase the cost of capital for start-up companies seeking VC
investment. As such, courts’ adherence to this principle risks interfering
with an efficient contracting practice that benefits both VC investors and
start-up companies alike.
Finally, as this last point suggests, the dynamic agency cost model has
important normative implications for corporate law in general. The
existence within a single firm of both inter-stakeholder and intrastakeholder conflicts places renewed emphasis on the need for governance
17

See infra TAN 38-41.
See Ronald J. Gilson and David M. Schizer, Understanding Venture Capital Structure: A Tax
Explanation for Convertible Preferred Stock 116 HARV. L. REV. 874, 875-76 (2003).
19
See e.g., id. at 875 (providing tax explanation for preferred stock usage); Thomas Hellman, IPOs,
Acquisitions and the Use of Convertible Securities in Venture Capital (Graduate Sch. Of Bus., Stanford
Univ., Research Paper No. 1702, 2000), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=257608 (explaining how convertible securities provide an optimal trade-off between the
need to allocate cash flows to VC investors and the desire to make efficient exit decisions); Berglöf,
supra note 15, at 247 (providing control theory for preferred stock usage); William Bratton, Venture
Capital on the Downside: Preferred Stock and Corporate Control, 100 MICH. L. REV. 891 (2002)
(same); Cornelli & Yosha, supra note 15 (finding convertible securities prevent signal manipulation by
entrepreneurs); Sahlman, supra note 9 (noting that “[f]lexible conversion terms alter the risk-and-returnsharing scheme” and encourage entrepreneurs to build value); see also infra TAN 56-59.
18
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structures to resolve these conflicts as they arise. While a full analysis of
these structures must await a separate exposition, the VC investment
experience provides at least two initial insights. First, where corporate
participants have themselves sought to mediate these conflicts through
express contract provisions, courts do little good by treating these
provisions as anything other than “contract.” To the extent courts rely on
doctrines such as the narrow construction of preferred stock rights, they
give a meaning to these contract provisions that is distinct from their
original intent and potentially increase the risk of agency problems within a
firm. Second, the dynamic development of agency problems in VC
investment provides a cautionary tale for those who seek to remedy agency
problems of any sort. As this Article shows, the very attempt to manage
one form of agency problems may itself result in a second—equally
troublesome—dimension of agency problems among other corporate
constituents.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II provides a brief overview of
the traditional agency costs model of VC investment, highlighting how it
provides an incomplete explanation for many prominent features of VC
finance. Part III sets forth a dynamic agency cost model of VC investment.
Specifically, it shows how the investment techniques described in Part II
create potential inter-investor conflicts of interest to which VC investors
respond by negotiating contract provisions that further increase the potential
for investor conflict. Part IV examines how the economy following the
“dot-com” bubble turned these potential conflicts into actual ones and laid
the foundation for a series of inter-investor lawsuits after 2000. These
include the landmark case of Benchmark Capital Partners v. Vague20—one
of the most famous lawsuits concerning the VC industry, but until now, one
that remained unexplained by the traditional agency cost model. After
examining the inter-investor dispute underlying Benchmark, Part V moves
to an explanation of how VC investors ordinarily rely on preferred stock
contracting to resolve these disputes and why this system failed in
Benchmark. The Part continues by examining how the development of
inter-investor conflict in Benchmark signifies the need to reassess the theory
of the firm in corporate legal scholarship. Part VI concludes.
II. THE TRADITIONAL AGENCY COST MODEL OF VC INVESTMENT
A. How to Make the Entrepreneur a Better Agent
Since William Sahlman published his highly influential article on VC
finance in 1990, 21 venture capital scholarship has been concerned with
primarily one question: how do VC investors respond to the extreme
uncertainty, information asymmetry and agency problems inherent in VC
20
21

2002 WL 31057462 (Del. Ch., July 15, 2002), aff’d, 822 A.2d 396 (Del. 2003).
See Sahlman, supra note 9.
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investment?22 From the perspective of intellectual history, the singular
obsession with this question is hardly surprising. Fundamentally, the
question is rooted in the same challenge that has occupied corporate law
scholars and economists for over half a century—how do investors in
modern corporations avoid the multiple problems that arise when ownership
of the corporation (i.e., equity investment) is separated from its control (i.e.,
management)? Appreciation of this challenge, famously articulated by
Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means in 193223 and subsequently formalized by
Jensen and Meckling in 1976, defines the primary analytical framework
used in contemporary corporate scholarship.24
Alternatively dubbed the “agency cost theory of the firm” and the
“nexus-of-contracts” conception of the corporation,25 this analytical
framework models organizations as webs of express, implied, and
metaphorical contracts among individuals with conflicting interests.26 At
the center of this web rests the corporation—a legal fiction that serves “as a
nexus for a set of contracting relationships among individuals.”27 A critical
insight of this approach has been to demonstrate the importance of
principal-agent economics for the study of firms. 28 Agency relationships
are created among contracting parties because one party (the agent) will
ordinarily hold discretionary and unobservable decision-making power to
affect the wealth of another (the principal). Recognizing that an agent may
not always act in its best interests, a principal may discount the value of the
relationship or it might expend resources to monitor the agent. Conversely,
to avoid these costs an agent might choose to offer “bonds” to a principal as
a guarantee of good faith. Monitoring and bonding are not costless,
22

See Gilson, supra note 9, at 1069.
See ADOLF A. BERLE & G ARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
127-52 (1932).
24
See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 12, at 248 (“The literature employing the principal-agent approach
[to corporate governance] is too voluminous to cite in its entirety.”); Robert Sitkoff, An Agency Cost
Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORN. L. REV. 621, 621 (2004) (“Agency cost theories of the firm dominate the
modern literature of corporate law and economics.”).
25
In general, legal scholars have demonstrated a propensity for the term “nexus-of-contracts” while
economists have preferred “agency cost theory,” although the terms are used inter-changeably within
both academic camps. Jensen and Meckling utilized each concept in setting forth the general theory, see
Jensen & Meckling, supra note 8, at 308-10, and all credit them with first developing the framework.
See Sharon Hannes, Images of Organizations and Interfirm Externalities: A Comment on Prof. Rubin, 6
THEOR. INQ. IN LAW 391, 393 n 3 (2005). This Article uses the term “agency cost theory” because (a) it
better emphasizes the principal-agent conflict between investors and managers that is central to corporate
scholarship in general and VC scholarship in particular and (b) it reflects Jensen and Meckling’s primary
concern with analyzing the scope of “agency costs” within a firm. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 8,
at 308-10.
26
See id. at 310-11. For a definitive exposition of this theory in corporate legal scholarship, see FRANK
H. EASTERBROOK AND DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 1-39
(1991).
27
Jensen & Meckling, supra note 8, at 310.
28
As Jensen and Meckling describe it, “[m]any problems associated with the inadequacy of the current
theory of the firm can also be viewed as special cases of the theory of agency relationships.” Id. at 308;
see also Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288, 291
(1980).
23
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however; nor are they perfect. It is impossible to prevent all divergences
between an agent’s decisions and those decisions that maximize the
principal’s welfare. Some residual welfare loss is inevitable in every
agency relationship that will likewise require the principal to discount the
value of the relationship. This residual loss, together with monitoring
expenditures by a principal and bonding expenditures by the agent,
constitute the total agency costs in an agency relationship.29
As applied to organizations, agency theory proved especially useful in
analyzing the conflict that exists between shareholders and managers.
Although agency relationships can exist among a variety of organizational
participants—shareholders vs. bondholders, labor vs. management, etc.—
corporate scholarship has focused primarily on the agency relationship
between shareholders and managers in modern public corporations.30 For
instance, shareholder-manager agency conflicts dominate Frank Easterbrook
and Daniel Fischel’s classic analysis, The Economic Structure of Corporate
Law. In their view, corporate law should generally defer to the contractual
arrangements explicitly or implicitly agreed to among corporate
participants, and the agency costs created by the “separation of management
and risk bearing” fundamentally shape these arrangements.31 Other
scholars, holding a less sanguine view of market efficiency, have used the
theory to argue for reform efforts that reduce agency costs born by public
company shareholders.32 Yet even where corporate scholars disagree over
the implications of this agency relationship, they share a common
predisposition to view it as the central agency relationship within a
corporation. Indeed, today the agency cost model is commonly described as
relating solely to the agency problems created by the separation between
management and risk-bearing equity in public corporations.33
Although VC investment occurs in private rather than public companies,
the influence of agency cost theory is clearly evident in virtually any
discussion of VC investment. In general, VC scholarship has focused on
the variety of agency problems a VC investor encounters due to the
separation between investment and company management. For instance, as
a condition of an investor’s investment, managers are required to transfer a
29

See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 8, at 308.
Jensen and Meckling themselves discuss only two agency relationships in setting forth their agency
cost theory: “the contract characterizing the relationship between the manager (i.e., agent) of the firm
and the outside equity and debt holders (i.e., principals).” Jensen & Meckling, supra note 8, at 310.
31
See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 26, at 8-22.
32
See, e.g., Reza Dibadj, Reconceiving the Firm, 26 CARD. L. REV. 1459, 1473-77 (2005) (summarizing
literature).
33
See, e.g., John Core, et. al., Is U.S. CEO Compensation Inefficient Pay Without Performance? 103
MICH. L. REV. 1142, 1145 (2005) (“This model rests on the widely accepted agency cost model of the
American corporation: diffuse ownership of large corporations leaves substantial discretion in
professional managers’ hands as to how to run the company, and managers can use this discretion in
ways that do not maximize shareholder value.”); see also Blair and Stout, supra note 12, at 248
(“Contemporary discussions of corporate governance have come to be dominated by the view that public
corporations are little more than bundles of assets collectively owned by shareholders (principals) who
hire directors and officers (agents) to manage those assets on their behalf.”).
30
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portion of the profits generated from the venture back to the investor.34 The
managers will therefore have a tendency to shirk or otherwise fail to exert
an optimal level of effort.35 The managers may also have incentives to use
firm resources to create private benefits, to adopt strategies that entail
inappropriate levels of risk relative to the expected return and/or to threaten
to leave the firm at a time when replacement of a manager is costly. 36
Additionally, managers know more about the company and their abilities
than investors do. This asymmetry of information makes it difficult for VC
investors to distinguish between competent and incompetent managers.37
Likewise, a primary goal of VC scholarship has been to understand the
manner in which VC investors address these agency problems and thereby
minimize the agency costs of VC finance. The literature is extensive,
ranging from descriptive accounts of VC contracts,38 to theoretical models
of optimal contract design, 39 to testing these models against empirical
analyses of VC contracts.40 Although commentators often differ as to the
optimal means to minimize agency costs, there is general consensus that
venture capitalists have developed financial contracts that are successful in
doing so.41 Under this agency cost model of VC investment, venture
capitalists accomplish this by designing contracts that provide for: (1)
staged investment, (2) the use of equity-based compensation, (3) control and
monitoring rights, (4) the sale of convertible preferred stock and (5) the
ability to syndicate investments.
1. Staged Investment. A venture capitalist will typically stage its
investment in a start-up company by incrementally investing capital over
time after observing the company’s progress in relation to its initial
projections.42 Staging its investment allows a VC investor to minimize the
risk of investing in an unfamiliar management team and a business with
uncertain prospects. If the business or team disappoints, the VC investor
may discontinue funding the company, thereby cutting its losses.
Staged investing also provides an important screening and monitoring
function. Managers, realizing the consequences of failing to meet their
projections, will be less likely to exaggerate a company’s prospects in
negotiating with a VC investor. Low-quality managers may be deterred all
34

See Steven Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An
Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts, at 3 (SSRN Elec. Paper Coll. No. 218175, 2000),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=218175.
35
See Klausner & Litvak, supra note 9, at 56.
36
See id.
37
See GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 9, at 158.
38
See, e.g., Sahlman, supra note 9; GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 9, at 157-273; Bernard Black &
Ronald Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital Markets: Banks Versus Stock Markets, 47 J.
FIN. ECON. 243, 253 (1998).
39
See supra note 15.
40
See, e.g., Kaplan and Strömberg, supra note 10, at 281 (comparing actual VC contracts to “the
assumed and predicted ones in different financial contracting theories.”); Kaplan & Strömberg, supra
note 9, at 2177-81 (same); G OMPERS & LERNER, supra note 9, at 171-200, 242-271.
41
See Klausner & Litvak, supra note 9, at 59.
42
See id. at 60; Black & Gilson, supra note 38, at 253.
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together from seeking VC financing.43 Once an investment is made, staged
investment thereafter provides a powerful incentive for managers to meet
the designated milestones in order to receive future financing. 44 Managers
might seek financing from an outside investor, but most commentators
believe an existing investor’s unwillingness to fund the company provides a
negative signal to new investors regarding the company’s quality.45
Moreover, the existing VC investor will likely have negotiated veto rights
and rights of first offer on the future issuance of securities that allow the
investor to block new equity financings by the company.46
2.
Equity-Based Compensation. The structure of management
compensation provides a secondary means to control the agency risks
inherent in VC investing. Management salaries at start-up companies will
often be set at relatively low amounts, with a significant component of
compensation consisting of stock options or shares of restricted “founders”
stock that vest over time. 47 By tying management’s compensation to the
company’s overall performance, equity-based compensation is intended to
minimize the risk that managers will shirk from their duties or pursue
private benefits that do not accrue to the company’s stockholders generally.
Likewise, the vesting provisions provide an incentive for management to
retain their employment, thereby minimizing the risk of management
departure.48
3. Control and Monitoring Rights. A VC investor also seeks to mitigate
agency risk with company managers through negotiating control and
monitoring rights that are disproportionate to its stock ownership. For
instance, Steven Kaplan and Per Strömberg found in their analysis of 213
VC investments in 119 start-up companies that a VC investor obtained the
right to a seat on the company’s board of directors in over 40% of the
financing transactions and controlled the board in 25%.49 Additionally, a
VC investor typically obtains special stockholder voting rights (or
“protective provisions”) allowing the investor to veto important corporate
actions.50 The scope of these protective provisions differs from company to
company, but a VC investor will commonly have veto rights over important
corporate transactions such as the issuance of securities, asset sales, mergers
or other changes in control.51 Lastly, the practical effect of staged financing
43

See Klausner & Litvak, supra note 9, at 60.
See id.
45
See id; but see infra TAN 98-103 (noting existing investors may stop funding a company without
necessarily harming its fundraising ability).
46
See id.
47
See id. at 62.
48
See id.
49
See Kaplan and Strömberg, supra note 10, at 287-89.
50
See Douglas G. Smith, The Venture Capital Company: A Contractarian Rebuttal to the Political
Theory of American Corporate Finance?, 65 TENN. L. REV. 79, 87-89 (1997).
51
See, e.g., NVCA, Model Certificate of Incorporation at 10 n18, available at
http://www.nvca.org/model_documents/model_docs.html [hereinafter, NVCA Model Charter]
(providing investor veto rights over the following actions: liquidation, dissolution, change-in-control,
44
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supplements these formal control rights: by controlling a company’s
funding spigot, a VC investor gains considerable influence over the
development of a company’s business.52
4. Use of Convertible Preferred Stock. In making an investment, a VC
investor generally acquires shares of a company’s convertible preferred
stock.53 Preferred stock entitles a VC investor to numerous preferential
economic rights such as a liquidation preference payable in the event of the
company’s liquidation or sale,54 preferential dividend rights, redemption
rights, and antidilution protection. 55 Ordinarily, shares of preferred stock
are convertible at the option of the holder into shares of common stock, at
which time all preferential rights are lost.
Financial economists have extensively modeled the manner in which
these preferred stock rights help address the agency costs and information
asymmetries typical of VC investing.56 Prior to a manager approaching a
venture capitalist, the preferential economic rights provide a screening
function by discouraging low-quality entrepreneurs from seeking VC
financing. 57 Similarly, after an investment has been made, these preferential
rights create an incentive for management to meet the company’s financial
projections. They do so by forcing managers to face a greater risk of
realizing little value on their common stock interests unless the company
performs well. 58 The use of preferred stock also enhances the incentive
effect of common stock options. The preferred stock rights allow a
company to issue common stock to an employee at a fraction of the price of
the preferred stock without any adverse tax consequences to the employee. 59
5. Syndication of Investments. Lastly, VC investors reduce agency risk
by partnering with one or more other VC investors when investing in a startup company.60 Moreover, as a start-up company requires additional
financing, the company and its VC investors will often solicit a new
investor to “lead” each round of financing. Existing investors will then coinvest alongside it.61 For instance, in one study an average of 2.2 VC firms
charter/bylaw modifications, creation/issuance of securities, purchase/redemption of securities, or
change in number of directors). The number of protective provisions requested by a VC investor may
often be tied to an investor’s geographic focus. A well-known generalization among practitioners is that
East Coast VC investors tend to request significantly more control rights than West Coast investors. As
the general counsel to Charles River Ventures jests, “From the West Coast perspective, [East Coast VC
firms] look like control freaks, who are simply going to be unhelpfully interfering with and impeding
what should just be routine corporate matters.” Sarah Reed, Will West Ever Meet East?: Bicoastal
Conflict in the Jargon of Venture-Capital Financing, 11 BUS. LAW TODAY (June 2002).
52
See Gilson, supra note 9, at 1069.
53
See Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 10, at 286 (reporting that convertible preferred stock was used in
95% of their sample financing transactions).
54
For a discussion of liquidation preferences, see infra TAN 91-93.
55
For a discussion of antidilution protection, see infra TAN 138.
56
For a summary of this literature, see supra TAN 19.
57
See Klausner & Litvak, supra note 9, at 64.
58
See id. at 65-66.
59
See Gilson & Schizer, supra note 18, at 889-909.
60
See Klausner & Litvak, supra note 9, at 66-67.
61
See Josh Lerner, The Syndication of Venture Capital, 23 FIN. MGMT. 16, 18 (1994).
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invested together at a company’s first stage of financing; at the second
stage, an average of 3.3 invested together; and in later stages the average
increased to 4.2.62
While syndication provides VC firms a means to diversify their
investment portfolios, it also plays an important role in addressing the
agency costs and information asymmetries inherent in VC investment.
Empirical studies of syndication patterns indicate that older and larger VC
firms tend to syndicate with one another,63 suggesting that VC investors
syndicate to obtain each other’s judgment with respect to particular
investment opportunities.64 Likewise, the use of a new investor to lead
subsequent financing rounds facilitates each financing by having an outside
third-party set the investment terms. At the same time, this aspect of
syndication promotes a screening function for the new investor: the new
investor may use the willingness of existing investors to co-invest as a
signal of the company’s perceived quality among its existing investors.65
B. Limitations of the Traditional Model
Although the traditional agency cost model explains many prominent
features of VC contracting, it omits much. Indeed, adherents of the model
have themselves noted that “real world” VC contracts are more complex
than the model predicts.66 To date, however, no one has sought to depart
from the standard account of VC investment to examine whether these
unexplained complexities stem from a common investment problem
unrelated to investor-manager conflicts. In particular, the fact that multiple
VC investors jointly invest in the same start-up company might suggest the
potential for inter-investor conflicts in the same way that shareholdershareholder conflicts routinely bedevil other closely-held corporations. Yet
even where scholars have recognized the possibility that investor conflicts
may exist, they have assumed away these conflicts to simplify their analysis
of investor-manager agency problems. 67 By relaxing this assumption,
however, it becomes possible to identify a number of unexplained features
62

See GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 9, at 261.
See id. at 261-66.
64
See Klausner & Litvak, supra note 9, at 66.
65
See id. at 67. While each of the aforementioned contracting techniques helps VC investors minimize
agency risk, they also give rise to the possibility that the venture capitalist may use the contract rights
opportunistically to extract concessions from management. Most commentators that have examined this
issue generally conclude that reputational concerns likely constrain an investor from acting
opportunistically towards management. See PAUL GOMPERS AND JOSH LERNER, THE MONEY OF
INVENTION: HOW VENTURE CAPITAL CRATES NEW WEALTH 12 (2001). The intuition is that a VC
investor who acts opportunistically towards management in one company will obtain a reputation for
opportunism among other managers. This could result in the VC investor receiving fewer invitations
from managers to finance promising companies, particularly in a community of venture capitalists and
entrepreneurs known for its small size and geographic concentration. See id. at 31-32; but see infra
TAN 205-207 (noting the significant growth and fluidity of the VC community).
66
Kaplan and Strömberg, supra note 10, at 307-308.
67
See supra TAN 10.
63
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of VC contracting that might very well exist because of the potential for
inter-investor conflicts.
One need not look far to find these common, unexplained features. For
instance, the VC practitioner literature is replete with articles discussing a
contracting provision called a “pay-to-play.”68 A pay-to-play penalizes a
company’s existing VC investors who fail to participate at a pre-specified
amount in a subsequent stage of a company’s financing. The penalty
ordinarily consists of the loss of certain preferential rights (such as an
investor’s antidilution protection) but may also consist of the automatic
conversion of a non-participating investor’s preferred stock into common
stock, thereby stripping the investor of all preferential rights.69
To date, neither financial economists nor legal academics have analyzed
this provision—a peculiar result given that it impairs a VC investor’s ability
to control investor-manager agency risk through staged financing.
Arguably, the provision would be consistent with the traditional agency
costs model if managers demanded the provision to protect themselves
against potential opportunism by VC investors.70 Yet a pay-to-play
provision applies only if a sufficient number of a company’s VC investors
approve a financing—approval by the company’s management is irrelevant.
Moreover, in practice it is VC investors and not managers who typically
demand the term. In a discussion of “[venture capital] terms that really
matter,” the managing director of one prominent VC firm explains why:
When our co-investors push back on this term, we ask: “Why? Are
you not going to fund the company in the future if other investors
agree to?” … A pay-to-play term insures that all the investors agree
in advance to the “rules of engagement” concerning participating in
future financings.71
The traditional agency cost model fails to explain why it is necessary to
establish these “rules of engagement” with other investors or why VC
investors might differ with regard to participating in future financings.
Similarly, the traditional agency cost model says little about why a
company’s VC investors would routinely bargain with each other over the
distribution of preferred stock rights among investors participating in its
different stages of financing. Indeed, adherents of the traditional model
commonly ignore the fact that start-up companies frequently grant different
preferential rights to its investors at each stage of financing.72 Those
68

See, e.g., John LeClaire, WatchMark Ruling Clarifies Pay-To-Play, VENTURE CAP. J., April 1, 2005
(noting that “[r]ecent times have seen a surge in the use of ‘pay-to-play’ techniques in private company
financing rounds”); Colin Blaydon & Michael Horvath, Bury the Ratchet, VENTURE CAP . J., January 1,
2002 (discussing pay-to-play).
69
For an example of a pay-to-play provision, see the NVCA Model Charter, supra note 51, at 32-34.
70
Cf. note 65.
71
Brad Feld, Term Sheet:
Pay-To-Play, Feld Thoughts (March 22, 2005),
http://www.feld.com/blog/archives/2005/03/term_sheet_payt.html (last visited January 21, 2006).
72
For instance, in their highly influential work on VC contracting, Ronald Gilson and David Schizer use
a single-stage investment framework to demonstrate how U.S. tax laws encourage the use of preferred
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commentators who have studied the issuance of preferred stock over
multiple stages have tended to focus on the different agency costs and
information asymmetries VC investors seek to control at each stage. For
instance, Paul Gompers and Josh Lerner have found that VC investors in
“late-stage” financings permit more time to elapse between a company’s
financing stages, as later-stage companies tend to demonstrate fewer agency
risks and therefore require less monitoring by VC investors.73 Conversely,
Steven Kaplan and Per Strömberg have argued that VC investors increase
their cash flow and control rights over financing rounds because VC
investors demand from managers “more equity and control as compensation
for providing additional funding.”74 Each study analyzed a company’s VC
investors as a homogenous whole; therefore, none studied the way in which
these stage-specific rights might affect relations among a company’s VC
investors.
Yet even a cursory look at several recent VC investments reveals that
much of the complexity of VC contracting stems from the allocation of
preferential rights among a company’s VC investors. Between January 1,
2001 and December 31, 2004, 142 U.S. start-up companies completed an
IPO after having completed more than one round of VC financing. 75
Analysis of these companies’ capitalization history reveals a typical capital
structure that is considerably more complex than that ordinarily depicted in
the traditional agency cost model. As predicted by the model, 132 (93%) of
the companies in the sample issued preferred stock to their VC investors.
What is universally ignored in the model, however, is the fact for 116 (88%)
of these companies, the preferred stock was issued in more than one series
(e.g., Series A, Series B, etc.).
Examination of these different series of preferred stock reveals real
economic differences in their terms. An example appears with FormFactor,
stock in the VC industry. Their framework depicts a VC investor making a $1 million investment in a
start-up company in which the investor receives the preferred stock rights described in Part II(A). After
demonstrating the limited economic significance of these preferential rights, Gilson and Schizer argue
that U.S. tax authorities nevertheless respect these formal economic rights and would allow the start-up
company to report a lower valuation for the company’s common stock because of them. This low
valuation, in turn, permits the issuance of “cheap” common stock to company managers, allowing them
to report any appreciation in the stock as (lower-taxed) capital gains rather than (higher-taxed) ordinary
income. See Gilson & Schizer, supra note 18, at 889-909. As with most proponents of the traditional
agency cost model, however, Gilson and Schizer refrain from analyzing how the issuance of preferred
stock in multiple stages of financing might affect the economic significance of a company’s preferred
stock. As discussed in Part V, the issuance of multiple series of preferred stock over time can result in
truly worthless common stock.
73
See GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 9, at 183-192.
74
Kaplan and Strömberg, supra note 10, at 313.
75
This sample was obtained through a database of VC financings maintained by Securities Data
Corporation (SDC). Information concerning each company’s capitalization history was obtained by
examining the company’s registration statement filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC). Companies organized outside the United States (or that have their headquarters outside the
United States) were excluded from the sample on the basis that non-US securities regulations and tax
laws often prevent these issuers from issuing preferred stock. Also excluded are companies for which no
registration statement was available.
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Inc., a start-up company that completed its IPO in 2003 and whose
registration statement contained a large amount of information concerning
its prior VC financings.76 From 1996 through 2001, FormFactor conducted
seven stages of financing, issuing a separate series of preferred stock at each
stage beginning with “Series A Preferred Stock” and ending with “Series G
Preferred Stock.” FormFactor’s VC contracts reflect clear bargaining
among its VC investors over the distribution of preferred stock rights among
these different series. For instance, with regard to liquidation preferences,
proceeds of a liquidation or acquisition of FormFactor were to be distributed
in the following order:77
Payment Priority
First $76,000,000 of proceeds
Next $13,000,000 of proceeds
Next $270,898 of proceeds
Any remaining proceeds

Recipient:
Holders of Series D – Series G
Preferred Stock
Holders of Series B and Series C
Preferred Stock
Holders of Series A Preferred
Stock
Holders of Series A Preferred
Stock and Common Stock

If, as the traditional agency cost model suggests, liquidation preferences
are about managing investor-manager conflicts, why would VC investors so
carefully structure this hierarchy of payouts among the different series?
Regardless of the order in which preferences are paid, the liquidation
preferences should have the same incentive effect on managers who hold
common stock, the most junior security. Likewise, significant bargaining
appears to have occurred with regard to which series of preferred stock
would be entitled to elect investor-representatives to the board of
directors.78 The negotiated arrangement of board representation is in
marked contrast to the description of VC investors’ board rights found in
VC scholarship where VC investors are analyzed collectively to determine
the extent to which they “control” the board of directors.79 If FormFactor’s
VC investors were uniformly aligned in their interest to maximize wealth,
why would they create this complicated structure of board representation?
FormFactor’s charter also makes clear that when a company’s later-stage
76

Data concerning FormFactor’s VC financings was obtained from the financial statements and exhibits
included as part of its S-1 Registration Statement. See FormFactor, Inc., Amendment No. 9 to Form S-1
(filed with SEC June 11, 2003)[hereinafter FormFactor Registration Statement].
77
See id. at F-17–F-18.
78
Under FormFactor’s charter, one director was to be elected by holders of a majority of the Series B
Preferred Stock; one director by holders of 70% of the Series D Preferred Stock; two directors by the
holders of the Series A Preferred Stock and Common Stock (voting together on an as-converted basis);
and one director by the holders of Common Stock and all Preferred Stock (voting together on an asconverted basis). See FormFactor, Form S-1, Exh. 3.01, at 6. [hereinafter FormFactor Certificate].
79
See supra TAN 49.
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VC investors received special preferential rights, older preferred series did
not necessarily receive the benefit of these new rights. For instance, only
the holders of FormFactor’s Series D through and Series G Preferred Stock
were entitled to antidilution protection. To the extent different VC investors
hold different amounts of the company’s seven series of preferred stock,
what types of inter-investor conflicts are created by the distribution of these
preferential rights?
Lastly, the traditional agency costs model does little to explain the
several lawsuits commenced by VC investors in recent years against other
VC investors involving a joint start-up company investment. The economic
downturn following the turn of the century led to a variety of lawsuits
against VC investors concerning their investments in start-up companies. 80
Most of these cases involved suits by managers against a company’s VC
investors, often alleging that VC investors opportunistically utilized
preferential rights to effect self-dealing transactions.81 In many of the cases,
however, the plaintiffs have been VC investors seeking redress against their
co-investors in a start-up company. Given the potential for VC investor
opportunism created by investors’ contract rights described in Part II(A), 82
the traditional agency costs model readily explains why a manager might
bring suit against VC investors. However, no analytical framework exists to
explain the reasons why a VC investor might initiate a lawsuit against a
fellow VC investor over a start-up company investment. To better
understand the structure of VC finance and its concomitant challenges for
VC investors, a more nuanced model of VC investment is required.
III. A DYNAMIC AGENCY COST MODEL OF VC INVESTMENT
By relaxing the assumption that a company’s VC investors act as a
unified whole, it is possible to modify the traditional agency cost model of
VC investment to account for several unexplained features of VC finance.
Under this modified model, VC contracts reflect not only VC investors’
attempts to address investor-manager conflicts but also the conflicts that
arise among a company’s VC investors. Indeed, as shown below, the very
contract provisions that address conflicts with a company’s managers create
the potential for inter-investor conflict.
Before proceeding further, it is useful to clarify how an inter-investor
conflict can exist among a company’s investors. In general, an interinvestor conflict can arise whenever a company action stands to benefit or
cost one investor in a manner that is different from the benefit or cost
realized by another investor. For example, where a start-up company
80
In a 2002 survey of court filings, the Venture Capital Journal identified fourteen “recent or active
lawsuits involving VCs.” Charles Fellers, VCs Mired in Litigation of Their Own Making, VENTURE
CAP. J., November 1, 2002.
81
For instance, of the lawsuits identified by the Venture Capital Journal, most were suits by company
founders against VC investors; five involved inter-investor lawsuits concerning a VC financing. See id.
82
See note 65.
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receives equity financing from investors with differing investment
objectives, the interests of the investors with respect to certain company
actions may differ. A venture capital division of a public corporation, for
instance, may co-invest with traditional VC investors in a company with
which the public corporation has a strategic relationship.83 In the event a
competitor of the public corporation seeks to acquire the company, the
interests of the corporate investor will undoubtedly differ from those of the
company’s traditional VC investors. While the corporate VC investor may
object to the acquisition for competitive reasons, the other VC investors will
desire the acquisition if it results in a significant return on their
investment. 84
Although these direct inter-investor conflicts exist in certain contexts,
the focus of this Article is on a more subtle and pervasive form of interinvestor conflict that exists among even traditional VC investors. Two
features of virtually all VC funds, when combined with the techniques
venture capitalists use to manage agency risk with managers, give rise to
these conflicts. Both features stem from the attempt by limited partners
85
(“LPs”) in a VC fund to protect against the risk that a venture capitalist
will himself be a poor agent of the LPs.
First, VC funds are constrained with respect to both time and capital in
their start-up company investments (the capital/time investment constraint).
Venture capital funds are limited in duration (funds ordinarily have a tenyear life) and have a limited amount of capital with which to make
investments.86 By imposing these limitations, LPs minimize their downside
risk if they invest in a poorly performing fund, and they also create a strong
performance incentive for the venture capitalist. Only by posting acceptable
returns for a fund will a venture capitalist be able to market future funds to
LPs and thereby continue in business.87
Second, in addition to these implicit incentives, VC funds provide
explicit incentives for a venture capitalist to achieve positive investment
returns (the investment return incentives).
Specifically, a venture
capitalist’s incentive compensation (or “carried interest”) creates a powerful
83

During 2003, corporate VC investors accounted for direct investments of $1.1 billion, or 6.3% of all
VC investments. See NATIONAL VENTURE CAPITAL ASSOCIATION YEARBOOK 2004 at 38 [hereinafter,
NVCA Yearbook].
84
To prevent a corporate investor from blocking such a transaction, venture capitalists require corporate
VC investors to sign a “drag-along” agreement, in which an investor agrees to vote for any acquisition
that is approved by stockholders holding a specified amount of preferred stock. See, e.g., NVCA, Model
Voting Agreement at 4 available at http://www.nvca.org/model_documents/model_docs.html (providing
for drag-along right).
85
VC funds are generally organized as limited partnerships. See David Rosenberg, Venture Capital
Limited Partnerships: A Study in Freedom of Contract, 2002 COLUM. B US. L. REV. 363, 365 (2002). In
the interest of simplicity, this Article will use the term “limited partners” or “LPs” when referring to
investors in these funds.
86
See Sahlman, supra note 9, at 489-91.
87
A number of studies have examined the manner in which the capital/time investment constraint
provides a “powerful incentive for venture capitalists to produce profits [on VC funds].” Rosenberg,
supra note 87, at 396. For a summary of this scholarship, see id. at 394-98.
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incentive to focus on posting positive returns for each VC fund. The carried
interest ordinarily entitles a venture capitalist to receive a specified
percentage (commonly 20%) of a fund’s realized profits.88 As a result, the
primary means for a venture capitalist to share in the success of the fund is
to achieve a net positive return on the fund’s start-up company investments.
The capital/time investment constraint and the investment return
incentives contribute to the formation of inter-investor conflicts in the
following manner. First, the capital/time investment constraint ensures that
VC investors will hold different amounts of a company’s preferred
securities that are issued at each stage of financing owing to investment
syndication and the staging of investments. Next, because these securities
are commonly issued at different prices at each stage of financing, the
capital/time investment constraint and the investment return incentives
encourage a company’s VC investors to develop conflicting interests
concerning the price at which it should sell these securities through a
company “exit event” and the price at which the company should issue
securities in the future. The fact that these securities are issued at different
times may also create conflicts among a company’s investors due to the
capital/time investment constraint: investors who purchase securities in
earlier stages of financing may be more limited in their ability to support the
company in future financings or to wait for an acceptable exit event.
That VC investors appreciate these potential conflicts becomes readily
apparent in examining VC contracts. This is especially true with regard to
contract provisions concerning exit events and future financings where the
potential for conflict is at its greatest. Yet as shown below, these carefully
negotiated provisions are at best imperfect solutions to resolving interinvestor conflict and may even accentuate inter-investor conflict in certain
circumstances. Indeed, it is this underlying imperfection in VC contracting
that laid the foundation for the inter-investor disputes that occurred
following the economic downturn in 2001.
Before turning to these contract provisions and the conflicts they
address, however, it is first necessary to understand how the combination of
staged investment and investment syndication leads a company’s VC
investors to acquire over time different amounts of a company’s differentlypriced securities.
A. The Economics of Staged Investment and Investment Syndication:
An Example
Assume EarlyFund, a VC investor, has agreed to invest $5,000,000 in
NewCo, a newly-formed start-up company. As an initial matter, EarlyFund
and NewCo must determine the company’s valuation following this
agreement.89 The valuation will determine the amount of the company
88

See GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 9, at 57-70.
See Brad Feld, Venture Capital Deal Algebra, Feld Thoughts (July 7, 2004),
http://www.feld.com/blog/archives/2004/07/venture_capital.html (last visited January 21, 2006).
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purchased by EarlyFund and, consequently, the extent to which the new
capital infusion reduces or “dilutes” the ownership interest of NewCo’s
existing stockholders. For instance, assuming EarlyFund values NewCo at
$10,000,000, EarlyFund’s $5,000,000 investment will purchase equity
representing 33.3% of NewCo’s ownership (i.e., $5,000,000 investment /
($10,000,000 valuation + $5,000,000 investment)).90 The ownership
interest of NewCo’s existing stockholders will correspondingly be reduced
from 100% to 66.6%.
EarlyFund and NewCo will use the valuation to determine the price per
share of the preferred stock issued to EarlyFund in the financing. To
calculate this price, the valuation must be divided by NewCo’s total number
of shares of common stock outstanding.91 Assuming there are 10,000,000
shares of common stock outstanding, a $10,000,000 valuation yields a price
per share of $1.00 (i.e., $10,000,000 valuation / 10,000,000 shares).
NewCo will therefore issue to EarlyFund 5,000,000 shares of preferred
stock at $1.00 per share in exchange for EarlyFund’s $5,000,000
investment.
Once established, the $1.00 price per share determines a number of
economic rights provided to EarlyFund. For instance, assuming EarlyFund
negotiates a liquidation preference, each share of preferred stock will be
entitled to a specified dollar amount per share prior to any payment on the
company’s common stock in the event of NewCo’s liquidation or
acquisition. Traditionally, this dollar amount would equal the per share
price paid by EarlyFund, or $1.00.92 Similarly, EarlyFund may negotiate
“antidilution” protection to protect itself against the dilution that will occur
if NewCo issues lower-priced stock in the future. If negotiated, the
preferred stock will contain antidilution protection that applies only if
NewCo issues stock in the future at a price below $1.00 per share.93
As NewCo undergoes additional rounds of staged financing, the
economic rights negotiated in each stage will similarly be tied to the price
per share of the preferred stock sold. Obviously, if the price of preferred
stock changes in each financing, tracking these preferred stock rights can
90
In contrast, if EarlyFund values NewCo at $15,000,000, it would purchase equity representing only
25% of NewCo’s ownership (i.e., $5,000,000 investment / ($15,000,000 valuation + $5,000,000
investment)).
91
For this purpose, the number shares of “common stock outstanding” ordinarily includes the number of
shares of common stock that may be issued contingently, such as shares reserved for issuance under a
stock option plan and shares that may be issued upon conversion of outstanding shares of preferred
stock. The definition of “common stock outstanding” for this equation is often highly negotiated
between a VC investor and a start-up company. In particular, differences may arise concerning the
treatment of contingent rights (such as warrants to purchase common stock or a proposed option plan
increase). A VC investor may argue that all contingent issuances be included in the number of shares of
common stock outstanding, thereby decreasing the price per share and increasing the percentage of the
company purchased in the new financing.
92
See Lee F. Benton et al., Hi-Tech Corporation: Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation, in
1 VENTURE CAPITAL & PUBLIC OFFERING NEGOTIATION 8-1, 8-13 (Michael J. Halloran et al. eds, 3d
Supp. 2004) [herinafter Hi-Tech Charter].
93
For a description of antidilution protection, see infra TAN 138.
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become quite complicated. As a result, the preferred stock authorized by
NewCo will consist of a special series of preferred stock to segregate the
rights of EarlyFund from the preferred stock rights of future investors. As
this is NewCo’s first round of financing, we will assume it adopts the
common industry practice of authorizing a new series of “Series A”
Preferred Stock to sell to EarlyFund.94
One year later, assume NewCo has successfully met its financial
projections and is in need of additional financing. In consultation with
EarlyFund, NewCo’s managers determine that an additional $10,000,000 of
capital is required to complete NewCo’s product development. Through the
assistance of EarlyFund, NewCo identifies a new VC investor, LaterFund,
to lead this “Series B” financing. Although LaterFund will be the lead VC
investor, EarlyFund also agrees to purchase its “pro rata share” in the Series
B financing, or 33% of the $10,000,000 offering.95 As discussed above, this
commitment assures LaterFund that EarlyFund supports the company’s
business. The commitment also allows EarlyFund to maintain a significant
equity position in a company that is successfully executing its business plan.
As in the Series A financing, NewCo and LaterFund must negotiate the
valuation of NewCo for the Series B financing. Given that NewCo has
successfully met its financial projections, LaterFund agrees to a higher
valuation of $30,000,000. Assuming NewCo has not issued stock since its
last financing, this new valuation results in a price per share of $2.00.96 In
addition, LaterFund, like EarlyFund in the Series A financing, will demand
that it purchase preferred stock in the financing to protect against potential
agency risks. NewCo will therefore create a new class of “Series B
Preferred Stock” to sell in the financing. As before, its terms will reflect the
economic rights negotiated by LaterFund and will be tied to the $2.00 price
per share. For example, if LaterFund negotiates the same liquidation
preference provided to EarlyFund, each share of Series B Preferred Stock
will be entitled to receive $2.00 per share prior to any payment on the
company’s common stock in the event of the company’s liquidation or
acquisition. Likewise, the Series B antidilution protection will apply only if
the company issues stock at a price that is less than $2.00 per share.
94

See Hi-Tech Charter, supra note 92, at 8-13.
Several studies have examined the tendency of VC investors to purchase their “pro-rata share” of a
later-stage offering. See Lerner, supra note 61, at 23-24 (examining tendency of VC investors to
purchase their pro-rata share in follow-on financings); Admati & Pfleiderer, supra note 15, at 373-74
(1994) (offering formal model for why VC investors tend to purchase their pro rata share in follow-on
rounds of financing). For purposes of this example, EarlyFund’s pro-rata share is defined to mean the
amount that keeps its ownership stake in NewCo the same as before the financing. In actuality, the
definition of “pro rata share” can be a subject of headed debate among a company’s investors. See Seth
Levine, What Does Pro-Rata Mean?, Feld Thoughts (Sept. 3, 2004).
96
As in the initial financing, the price per share is determined by dividing the “pre-money” valuation
(here, $30,000,000) by the total number of shares of common stock outstanding calculated on an asconverted-to-common-stock basis. See infra note 91. NewCo has outstanding 10,000,000 shares of
common stock and 5,000,000 shares of preferred stock, resulting in a total of 15,000,000 outstanding
shares on an as-converted-to-common-stock basis.
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Given EarlyFund’s commitment to purchase its pro rata share,
EarlyFund will purchase 1,666,667 shares of Series B Preferred Stock for
approximately $3,333,333.
LaterFund will purchase the remaining
3,333,333 shares for approximately $6,666,666. After the financing, the
company’s stockholders will therefore hold the following securities:
Series A
Preferred Stock:
Stockholder: Shares
%
EarlyFund
5,000,000 100%
LaterFund
0
0%
Founders
0
0%
Total:
5,000,000 100%

Series B
Preferred Stock: Common Stock:
Total:
Shares
%
Shares
%
Shares
%
1,666,667 33.3%
0
0% 6,666,667 33.3%
3,333,333 66.6%
0
0% 3,333,333 16.7%
0
0% 10,000,000 100% 10,000,000 50.0%
5,000,000 100% 10,000,000 100% 20,000,000 100%

As shown in this example, the combination of staged investing and
syndication results in EarlyFund and LaterFund holding significantly
different amounts of the differently-priced Series A and Series B Preferred
Stock. Three factors typical of VC investment contributed to this outcome.
First, NewCo’s valuation changed from the Series A financing to the
Series B financing. A fundamental principle of VC investment is that the
valuation of a company successfully meeting its milestones will increase at
each stage of financing. 97 Conversely, a company failing to meet its
milestones will experience a decline in valuation.
Second, LaterFund missed the opportunity to purchase securities at the
Series A valuation; if it wanted to invest in the company, it could purchase
only the Series B Preferred Stock at $2.00 per share. This is an obvious
consequence of syndication. Each new investor will be limited to
purchasing securities with a purchase price reflecting the current company
valuation. In general, this means that new investors buy a new and
differently-priced security than a company’s existing investors hold.
Lastly, LaterFund invested significantly more in the Series B financing
than EarlyFund. A new investor commonly requires a company to offer it a
significant portion of the later-round financing to ensure that it acquires a
meaningful financial stake in the company.98 Moreover, as the example
97
Prominent venture capitalists Alan Salzman (of VantagePoint Venture Partners) and John Doerr (of
Kleiner, Perkins, Caufield & Byers) note, “[i]f a company is successful accomplishing and moving
through it development cycle, it should be able to raise capital less expensively (i.e., achieve a higher
company valuation) as time and success progress and the company is able to accomplish the removal or
significant reduction of major business risks.” Alan Salzman and John Doerr, The Venture Financing
Process, in START-UP & EMERGING COMPANIES at §7.03 (Richard D. Harroch ed., 1998).
98
For this reason, a company’s VC investors routinely waive their contractual preemptive rights in each
round of financing in order to permit new investors to purchase a larger share of the financing round.
See Jay Hachigian and Brooks Stough, Venture Capital: Key Issues in Follow-On Financing Rounds in
35TH ANNUAL I NSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 193, 221-22 (Practicing Law Inst. Course
Handbook Series No. 1396, 2003). Preemptive rights generally entitle the company’s VC investors to
purchase their pro rata share of any new securities issued by a start-up company. Absent a waiver of
these rights, it may not be possible to issue securities in significant amounts to new investors.
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illustrates, differential share ownership results even with full pro-rata
participation by EarlyFund. Assuming no additional shares of common
stock are issued by NewCo and full pro rata participation by EarlyFund and
LaterFund in future financings, EarlyFund will always hold 33.3% of any
new issuance (but 100% of the Series A Preferred Stock) while LaterFund
will hold 16.7% of any new issuance (but 66.6% of the Series B Preferred
Stock).
In actuality, a number of factors cause VC investors to participate at less
than their original pro-rata share in future stages of financing. As a matter
of simple mathematics, a VC investor’s “pro rata share” will ordinarily
decrease as a company matures. When NewCo hires additional employees
to execute its business plan, it will generally compensate these employees
with equity, thereby requiring the issuance of additional shares of common
stock or common stock options.99 As NewCo issues new common stock,
the percentage ownership of EarlyFund and LaterFund will automatically
decrease, causing a concomitant decrease in their respective pro rata shares
of future offerings.100
In addition, a VC fund will ordinarily have a number of structural
limitations in its ability to participate in future financings. For one, the
capital/time investment constraint provides a practical limit on whether an
investor can invest in a future financing. When a VC investor makes an
initial investment in a start-up company, it allocates a “reserve” for followon investments that it must spread over all future financings. The size of
this reserve is seldom more than the size of the original investment, 101
commonly resulting in a reduction in the size of each follow-on investment.
More importantly, if a fund under-allocates the amount of capital it needs
for follow-on investments, the fund may run out of capital to support further
investments in its portfolio. 102 A VC fund may also have limitations in its
partnership agreement regarding the extent it may participate in future
99

See supra Part II(A)(2).
For instance, if after the Series B Financing, NewCo adopted a stock option plan consisting of
10,000,000 shares, EarlyFund’s pro rata share of future financings would decrease to 22.2% (6,666,667 /
30,000,000), and LaterFund’s pro rata share would decrease to 11.1% (3,333,333 / 30,000,000).
101
Prior to the 2001-2003 economic downturn, venture capitalists would often use a fifty-fifty or even a
“two-thirds/one-third” principle for determining the size of a follow-on reserve. For example, a twothirds/one-third principle would require two-thirds of a fund’s committed capital being allocated to new
investments and one-third to all follow-on investments. See Carolina Braunschweig, Staying Afloat: VCs
Raise Annex Funds to Buoy Waning Portfolios, VENTURE CAP. J., August 1, 2001. Later-stage funds
have historically allocated even less amounts to follow-on financings. See, e.g., Robyn Kurdek, FTV
Banks $423M For Second Fund, PRIVATE EQUITY WEEK, January 14, 2002 (noting that FTV, a later
stage investor, reserved “significantly less than 50% of the capital … for follow-on financings”).
102
Under-allocation for follow-on financings became a widespread problem during the 2001-2003
economic downturn. The tendency of VC investors to allocate most of their capital towards initial
investments resulted in many funds having to raise “annex” funds in 2001 and 2002 for the specific
purpose of providing follow-on financing to start-up companies. During this time, venture-backed
companies were unable to achieve exit events due to the lackluster financial markets. When companies
were unable to raise financing from outside sources, existing investors were required to provide the
much-needed capital, thereby putting significant stress on the traditional model for allocating reserves.
See Braunschweig, supra note 101, at 3.
100
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financings. For instance, VC fund partnership agreements commonly have
investment limitations that restrict the amount of capital a fund is permitted
to invest in any one company. 103
Even without these structural constraints, limiting a fund’s investment to
primarily early or later rounds of financing may be an important component
of satisfying a fund’s investment purpose. Venture capital firms routinely
market themselves to companies and LPs as focusing on either “early stage”
or “late stage” investments. 104 For LPs, the distinction is of significant
importance in understanding a VC firm’s risk profile, and a VC investor
may be weary of justifying to its LPs a significant departure from its stated
investment objective. Thus, for any of these reasons, a company’s existing
VC investors often invest less in a new round of financing than investors
leading the round.
Once again, FormFactor provides a true-life example of the manner in
which a company’s VC investors will hold differing combinations of a
company’s differently-priced securities. Formed in 1993, FormFactor
received its first VC investment in 1996 when Mohr Davidow Ventures
(“MDV”), an “early stage venture capital firm,”105 purchased 3,390,822
shares of Series B Preferred Stock at a price of $0.87, for a total investment
of nearly $3,000,000.106 The company’s next round of VC financing
occurred in 1996 when it sold 3,298,161 shares of Series C Preferred Stock
at $1.65 per share, of which MDV purchased 37% for approximately
$2,000,000. A new “expansion stage” VC investor,107 Institutional Venture
Partners (“IVP”), led this round of financing and purchased 55% of the
shares sold for $3,000,000.108 Between 1997 and 1998, the company sold
5,552,973 shares of Series D Preferred Stock at $3.45 for gross proceeds of
almost $20,000,000. Of this amount, MDV and IVP each purchased only
434,783 shares (7.5% of the offering) in exchange for investments of
$1,500,000 each. New investors Intel Corporation and later-stage VC
investor Morgan Stanley Venture Partners (“MSVP”)109 provided the
majority of the investment, with Intel investing approximately $5,000,000
and MSVP investing approximately $7,000,000.
Following these financings, the company’s three primary VC investors
significantly curtailed their investments. In its Series E financing in 1999,
FormFactor raised $20,000,000 by selling 2,666,666 shares of Series E
103

See Klausner & Litvak, supra note 9, at 70.
See, e.g., infra notes 105, 109.
105
MDV website at www.mdv.com.
106
General information concerning FormFactor’s financing history was obtained from the financial
statements included as part of FormFactor’s S-1 Registration Statement. See supra note 76. Information
concerning individual holdings of VC investors was obtained from the company’s Sixth Amended and
Restated Rights Agreement. See FormFactor, Inc., Form S-1, Exh. 4.02 (Apr. 22, 2002). FormFactor
had previously raised $349,000 from management in 1995 by selling shares of Series A Preferred Stock
at $0.05 per share. See id.
107
IVP website, at http://www.ivp.com/.
108
See FormFactor Registration Statement, at F-17–F-18.
109
See MSVP website, at www.morganstanley.com/institutional/ venturepartners/faq.html?page=faq.
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Preferred Stock at a price of $7.50 per share. A group of the company’s
strategic partners led the financing; MDV, IVP and MSVP collectively
invested only $849,000 in this round (4% of the offering). 110 MDV, IVP
and MSVP did not participate at all in the company’s subsequent Series F or
Series G financings in 2000 and 2001, respectively. Instead, a combination
of individuals and corporations provided the investments by purchasing
633,130 shares of Series F Preferred Stock at $11.00 per share and 579,672
shares of Series G Preferred Stock at $15.00 per share.
Thus, as FormFactor underwent multiple rounds of VC financing, its
earlier investors significantly diminished their level of participation in each
subsequent round. The result was a company capital structure in which
each VC investor held a different amount of the company’s differentlypriced securities. Having explained how this situation results from staged
investing and investment syndication, it is now necessary to explain how
this situation creates the potential for inter-investor conflict.
B. Inter-Investor Conflicts
Differences in investor participation levels in each stage of company
financing can give rise to a number of potential conflicts among a
company’s VC investors owing to venture capital fund structure. As this
section demonstrates, VC investors are clearly aware of these potential
conflicts and utilize VC contracts at each stage of financing to address them.
Indeed, for a VC investor and its lawyer, resolving or containing these
conflicts at each investment stage appears to be just as critical for successful
VC investment as containing the conflict between managers and investors.
Although inter-investor conflicts might arise in a variety of contexts,111 the
two that appear to play the largest role in VC contracts are those relating to
the company’s ultimate exist strategy and the company’s future financing.
1. Conflicts over Exit Events. In general, VC investors ordinarily seek
to “exit” company investments through one of two principal methods: the
sale of shares into the public markets after a company’s IPO or an
acquisition of a company for cash or publicly-traded securities. 112 In either
case, differences in VC investors’ stock ownership may create differences
as to what constitutes an acceptable exit event for a company. As one
prominent attorney in the industry notes, “the actual exit strategy employed
… may require cooperation from shareholders who will not (or may not) be
in agreement with the timing, price or other terms as proposed by [a
particular] VC.”113
110

MDV invested $349,000; IVP and MSVP each invested $250,000. See FormFactor Registration
Statement, at F-17–F-18.
111
See supra TAN 83-81.
112
See LEVIN, supra note 7, at 9-3.
113
Id. at 1-11. The general partners of Blueprint Ventures echo a similar sentiment:
Certainly, most VCs can recite the “IPO or M&A” exit strategy for each of their companies.
But how many VCs agree, inside their partnerships and inside their investment syndicates, on
an acceptable exit value of their investment? In many cases we know, venture investors many
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The source of these differences arises from the potentially different
investment returns each VC investor in a start-up company will receive on a
proposed exit. In FormFactor, for instance, investors who acquired shares
of the company’s Series G Preferred Stock at $15 per share would view less
favorably a proposed IPO in 2003 at $10 per share than MDV whose
average price paid per share was $1.34. MDV would stand to realize at this
price a total return on investment of almost 650%, or an annual internal rate
of return (“IRR”) of approximately 40%. 114 In contrast, a stockholder who
only participated in the Series G financing would realize a total loss of
-33%, or an annual IRR of approximately -18%. The extent to which VC
investors purchase their pro-rata share in each stage of financing does little
to mitigate the potential for divergent investment returns among VC
investors. In the NewCo example, even though EarlyFund purchased its
pro-rata share of the Series B offering, its average price per share ($1.25)
was $0.75 less than LaterFund’s. As a result, following the Series B
financing of NewCo, any acquisition of NewCo that valued the company at
less than $40,000,000 (or $2.00 per share) but more than $25,000,000 (or
$1.25 per share) would result in a negative return on investment for
LaterFund, but a positive return on investment for EarlyFund.
The structure of the VC market prevents investment cost from ever
becoming “sunk” for several reasons. As a general matter, venture
capitalists must offer LPs the prospect of significant investment returns in
order to compensate them for the limited liquidity and significant risks
associated with start-up investments. Among early-stage venture capitalists,
for instance, it is generally assumed that an investment portfolio should
yield an IRR of approximately 30-50%. 115 Moreover, because many of
these investments will ultimately be written off, each individual investment
should promise a 40-50% projected IRR after accounting for the venture
capitalist’s fees and compensation. 116
VC fund structure further accentuates this concern with investment
returns owing to the capital/time investment constraint and the investment
return incentives. First, the intense pressure to raise successive VC funds
can encourage a venture capitalist to time exit events so as to accelerate
positive returns and to delay negative returns. By exiting an investment
with a significant return, a VC investor locks in a gain that helps lift the IRR
of a portfolio likely to contain several losing investments. For a VC
years into an investment will continue to politely disagree on the ideal exit amount for the
company.
Bart Schachter & George Hoyem, What VCs Can Learn from Their Cousins in Buyouts, VENTURE CAP .
J., Sept. 1, 2004.
114
In general, an IRR measures the performance of an investment that requires and produces a number of
cash flows over time. An IRR is the discount rate that equates the present value of all cash in-flows
associated with an investment with the sum of the present value of the cash outflows accruing from it
and its present unrealized value.
115
See Salzman and Doerr, supra note 97, at §7.02[2].
116
See id.
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investor in the process of raising another fund, these early “home runs” may
be critical to attracting LPs.117 Moreover, under the prevailing industry
valuation standards, VC investors generally carry a company investment at
cost until an exit event or a subsequent financing.118 IRR calculations will
therefore be higher the sooner a fund liquidates a successful investment.
For similar reasons, a VC investor faced with a losing investment may
present a healthier picture of its overall portfolio to its current and
prospective LPs by delaying an exit: an investment valued at cost simply
looks better to LPs than an investment loss.
In addition to these marketing pressures, the carried interest also
encourages venture capitalists to focus on accelerating positive returns and
delaying negative returns. As noted above, the carried interest entitles a
venture capitalist to receive a specified percentage (usually 20%) of the
profits realized on a fund’s start-up company investments.119 A corollary of
the carry is the so-called “claw-back” provision, which ensures that the
venture capitalist receives no more than her specified percentage of fund
profits upon winding-up a fund. This result can occur where a VC fund
initially liquidates profitable investments and later liquidates losing
investments—a common pattern among VC funds. 120 In such situations, the
claw-back provision requires a venture capitalist to recontribute capital to
the fund in order to avoid receiving excess compensation. Consequently,
the ability of a venture capitalist to realize a profit rather than a loss on an
investment may potentially mean the difference between receiving an
incentive payment from the VC fund and having to recontribute capital to
its LPs.121
Thus, because of staged investment and syndication, a venture capitalist
who invests in a start-up company faces a discernable risk that it may
disagree at some point with the company’s other VC investors concerning
117
See, e.g., Lawrence Aragon, Harvard Revs Up Ignition’s Third Fund, VENTURE CAP. J., December 1,
2004 (reporting that successful fundraising “isn’t about who know that counts; it’s whether you can
show a return on investment”); see also GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 9, at 241 (noting propensity
among venture capitalists to “grandstand”—taking a start-up company public as quickly as possible—to
facilitate fund-raising among LPs).
118
Most firms have adopted the valuation guidelines that were proposed to, but never adopted by, the
NVCA in 1989. In general, these guidelines specify that a company investment should be carried at cost
unless a different value is justified by the last round of financing (if the financing includes a new outside
investor) or if the company otherwise experiences a material change in financial condition. See Colin
Blaydon and Fred Wainwright, The Stage Is Set, PRIVATE EQUITY INT’L., May 2004.
119
See infra TAN 88.
120
See Steven Franklin and Stig Colberg, Evaluating and Managing a Potential Clawback Liability,
VENTURE CAP . J., Sept. 1, 2002.
121
Assume, for instance, a fund makes two investments of $100 each and provides for a 20% carry. If
the first investment is sold for $1,000, the fund must first return $100 to LPs as return of capital.
Thereafter, it may distribute the $900 of profits 80% to LPs ($720) and 20% to the venture capitalist as
carry ($180). If the second investment is written-off as worthless, the net profit of the fund will be $800
(i.e., $1000 - $200), requiring the venture capitalist to recontribute $20 to the LPs to ensure its carried
interest does not exceed 20% of fund profits. If the fund had sold the second investment at cost (i.e.,
$100), the net profit of the fund would have been $900 (i.e., $1,100 - $200), thereby avoiding any lookback liability. See id.
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what constitutes a proper exit event. In the highly volatile start-up markets,
investors holding higher-priced securities may simply be more willing than
holders of lower-priced securities to postpone an exit event until the next
“up” market. Moreover, the challenge of achieving investor consensus on
this issue is made more complicated by the limited life of VC funds.
Because of the ten-year term of most funds, an early investor who has held
an investment for several years may face a structural incentive to exit at a
time when a company’s later investors are not subject to these pressures. A
company’s earlier investors may therefore be less willing to forgo a lowvalue exit yielding a return on investment, even if the investors believe the
company could obtain a higher valuation in the long-term.122
Given the risk that a company’s VC investors may disagree over an
acceptable exit event, an important aspect of VC contracting centers on
mechanisms that contain this risk. In the words of one leading VC lawyer,
“contracts signed at the time of VC’s initial investment will generally give
VC certain future rights to control its exit strategy. This is especially
important where VC will not (or may not) control portfolio company at the
back end when the exit strategy is executed.”123
In the context of an IPO, a VC investor will ordinarily obtain these
special control rights by demanding a veto right over the completion of an
IPO at an unacceptably low price per share. VC investors accomplish this
by relying on the virtually universal practice among investment bankers
that, prior to completing an IPO, all shares of a company’s preferred stock
must convert into common stock. 124 Because of this industry practice, the
preferred stock purchased by VC investors will generally have a provision
requiring the automatic conversion of preferred stock upon either an IPO at
a pre-specified price-per-share or the requisite vote of preferred
stockholders.125 For many investors, a condition to making a company
investment will be setting the automatic conversion price of its preferred
stock to a price that equals or exceeds its purchase price. Likewise, with
regard to an automatic conversion by means of a stockholder vote, VC
investors commonly seek a special veto right with respect to the conversion
of its shares of preferred stock.126 As a result of these two provisions, a VC
investor can block the conversion of its preferred stock on an IPO if the
offering price is less than the investor’s purchase price.
An example of each of these techniques appears in FormFactor’s
charter. Under FormFactor’s charter, shares of Series A, Series B, Series C
122

On the challenges that an early-stage investor faces due to the limited term of a fund, see Ravi
Chiruvolu, Before You Do That Amazing Biotech Deal, Read this Story, VENTURE CAP . J., December 2,
2004.
123
LEVIN, supra note 7, at 1-11.
124
See Maha Ibrahim, et al., Illustrative Venture Investment Term Sheet, in 35TH ANNUAL I NSTITUTE ON
SECURITIES REGULATION 193, 221-22 (Practicing Law Inst. Course Handbook Series No. 1396, 2003).
125
See, e.g., Kaplan & Strömberg, supra note 10, at 289 (finding automatic conversion provisions in
95% of the financing rounds examined).
126
See Hi-Tech Charter, supra note 92, at 8-36–8-37.
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and Series D Preferred Stock would automatically convert into common
stock at an IPO having a price per share of at least $6.90—a price well in
excess of the per share purchase price of each series. For the higher-priced
Series E, Series F and Series G Preferred Stock, the minimum IPO price for
automatic conversion of each series was set at exactly its per share purchase
price (i.e., $7.50, $11.00 and $15.00, respectively).127 To convert any series
of FormFactor’s preferred stock by means of a stockholder vote, it was
necessary to obtain the approval of two-thirds of the outstanding shares of
each series.128
A VC investor will also seek to protect its particular economic
preferences concerning the price and timing of a company acquisition.
These protections may take the form of either special veto rights or special
liquidation preferences. With regard to veto rights, a VC investor may seek
specific, class veto rights that guarantee it a blocking right over a
company’s acquisition. Alternatively, where existing investors already hold
an approval right over an acquisition, a later-stage investor may seek to
increase the voting threshold required for approving an acquisition to ensure
that its vote is required.
In addition to veto rights, a new VC investor may seek to protect its
preferences concerning an exit event through a senior liquidation
preference. As noted above, a liquidation preference entitles a stockholder
to a specified preferential return (ordinarily, an investor’s purchase price) on
its preferred shares prior to any common stock payments in the event of a
company’s acquisition.129 A senior liquidation preference entitles one VC
investor to receive its liquidation preference in advance of other VC
investors’. According to one attorney in the industry,
The general rule with respect to priorities among multiple rounds of
preferred stock investments is that of LIFO—“last in, first out.” New
investors in a later-stage company will want to ensure that in the
event of a redemption or liquidation, their money comes out first….
Later stage investors are particularly concerned about liquidation
preferences. 130
Unfortunately, understanding the manner in which VC investors seek to
protect their particular preferences regarding a company’s exit strategy is
not always easy to discern. The ability to identify how VC investors resolve
potential conflicts over a company exit event requires an analysis of VC
investor stock ownership, as well as an understanding of how voting rights
and liquidation preferences can work in tandem to create a system of
reciprocal veto rights.
For instance, a straightforward analysis of
127
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FormFactor’s charter might suggest its VC investors are generally aligned
in their preference concerning the company’s acquisition. Under its charter,
the protective provisions provide merely that an acquisition of the company
must be approved by the holders of a majority of the shares of Series B
through Series G Preferred Stock. 131 However, analysis of the VC
investors’ stock ownership reveals a more complicated story: this voting
threshold ensured that no acquisition could occur without the collective
approval of MDV, IVP and MSVP.132
The voting threshold clearly provided less protection to the Series E
through Series G investors, as MDV, IVP and MSVP could approve an
acquisition without their consent. How did these VC investors protect
against the risk that MDV, IVP and MSVP would approve a low-value
acquisition? The answer is in the liquidation preferences negotiated by
these investors: the company’s charter granted to the holders of Series D
through G Preferred Stock a senior liquidation preference. This liquidation
preference guaranteed that if MDV, IVP and MSVP approved a low-value
acquisition, no proceeds could be paid on their shares of Series B and Series
C Preferred Stock until each share of Series D through Series G Preferred
Stock had been distributed an amount equal to the share’s original cost (i.e.,
$3.45, $7.50, $11.00 and $15.00, respectively). In other words, no VC
investor was at risk that an acquisition would be approved against its will
where the investor did not receive back at least its original investment cost.
As analysis of FormFactor’s charter reveals, the common use among VC
investors of series veto rights and liquidation preferences seeks to address a
fundamental challenge of VC investment. It is a challenge unrelated to
concerns about whether managers will act as good agents. Rather, it is a
challenge arising from the potentially conflicting interests among VC
investors concerning what constitutes a proper exit event for a start-up
company.
2. Conflicts over Future Financings. Additionally, upon investing in a
start-up company, a VC investor must address the potentially different
preferences among investors concerning future funding commitments to the
company and the price at which the company completes a future financing.
First, a VC investor in a company may have concerns that its coinvestors will be unwilling to provide future financing to the company.
These concerns are likely to be especially pronounced where the company’s
VC investors have invested at different times due to the capital/time
investment constraint of VC funds. In comparison to a late-stage investor, a
company’s early-stage investor may more quickly expend its internal
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funding allocation to the company or its fund may simply lack the capital to
make additional investments.133
Second, differences in the prices at which a company’s VC investors
acquire their securities may create different sensitivities concerning the
price at which the company issues securities in the future. Ordinarily, a VC
investor will expect its ownership percentage in a start-up company to be
diluted when the company issues stock to new investors at a higher price
than the VC investor paid for its own shares. Although its percentage
ownership of the company will diminish, the value of the stockholder’s
ownership interest will generally be the same or greater after the issuance.
This is because the higher price stock issuance means that the company has
a greater enterprise valuation than it did at the time of issuing the existing
investor’s lower-priced securities.134
In contrast, when a company issues stock below the price paid by the
VC investor, the dilution suffered by the investor is costly for two reasons.
First, the lower price of the new stock relative to the shares held by the VC
investor indicates that the value of its investment has decreased since it
acquired its securities. As a result, the VC investor may be required to
report a decrease in the value of its investment in its LP financial reports.135
Second, the lower price of the new stock will cause the company to sell a
greater number of shares of preferred stock than the VC investor could have
purchased with its own investment, thereby diluting the investor’s
ownership interest. Unless the VC investor is willing and able to purchase
its pro-rata share of the issuance, the dilution may significantly decrease its
prospective return on investment. Thus, a holder of primarily lower-priced
stock will ordinarily hold different preferences than holders of higher-priced
stock regarding the desirability of the company issuing securities at
particular prices.
Given these potentially divergent preferences, a new VC investor will
often seek contractual rights that protect its particular preferences
concerning future financings. With regard to the risk that a company’s VC
investors may stop funding the company in the future, a VC investor may
seek to implement the pay-to-play provision discussed earlier.136 By
forcibly stripping the preferred rights of a non-participating investor, a payto-play provides a significant deterrent against failing to participate in a
financing that triggers the provision.
With regard to the risk that the company will complete a low-priced
financing, a VC investor will ordinarily request upon making an investment
a combination of stockholder veto rights and price-based antidilution
133
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protection. As before, FormFactor provides a concrete illustration of both
techniques. FormFactor’s charter provided that the approval of the holders
of a majority of the shares of Series B through Series G Preferred Stock
would be required for the company to authorize or issue any security that
was senior to or on a parity with the existing preferred stock.137 Analysis of
the company’s stock ownership records indicates that this voting threshold
effectively gave MDV, IVP and MSVP the collective power to approve (or
disapprove) a future financing of FormFactor. As with the veto rights over
FormFactor’s acquisition, this voting provision appears to place at risk the
interests of FormFactor’s later-stage investors who held higher-priced
shares of preferred stock. Given that MDV, IVP and MSVP held relatively
lower-priced shares, they might approve a financing at a price per share that
would be unacceptably low to the company’s later-stage investors. These
later-stage investors might prefer the company negotiate harder for a better
valuation of the company.
To protect against this potential conflict, FormFactor’s later-stage
investors obtained price-based antidilution protection.
Antidilution
protection diminishes the dilutive effect of a lower-price stock issuance by
increasing, upon the issuance of the lower-priced stock, the ratio at which
each share of the VC investor’s preferred stock converts into common
stock. As a result, the VC investor’s preferred stock will convert into a
greater number of shares of common stock than prior to the issuance, and on
an as-converted-to-common-stock basis, the preferred stockholder will
suffer less dilution from the new stock issuance than if no adjustment had
been made. 138 In FormFactor, the Series D through Series G Preferred
Stock each contained “weighted-average” antidilution protection that was
tied to the purchase price of each series. For instance, if the company
issued stock between $11.00 and $15.00 per share, the Series G Preferred
Stock—and only the Series G Preferred Stock—would receive an increase
in its common stock conversion rate. This adjustment would diminish the
dilutive effect of the stock issuance by allowing the Series G preferred stock
to convert into more shares of common stock. Likewise, if the company
issued stock between $7.50 and $11.00 per share, both the Series F and
Series G Preferred Stock would receive an antidilution adjustment. Similar
adjustments would occur for the Series D and Series E Preferred Stock
should the company issue stock below their original issuance prices.
Thus, in contrast to most accounts of VC investment, the specific
provisions that appear in VC contracts are not just about controlling agency
137
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risks with company managers. Clearly, VC investors demand special
contract rights to protect against these agency risks. But they also demand
provisions that address the potential conflicts among a company’s VC
investors over the exercise of these contract rights. VC investors may be in
agreement that they should have a vote on the sale or financing of a
company; however, getting them all to agree on what constitutes a proper
sale or financing is an entirely different matter.
In describing the manner in which a company’s VC investors contain
potential inter-investor conflicts, it should also be clear that the existing
system is far from perfect. The provisions described above do little to
eliminate the underlying potential for inter-investor disputes. For instance,
the senior liquidation preference held by FormFactor’s later stage investors
might permit a low-value acquisition proposal to be acceptable to these
later-stage investors, but unacceptable to MDV, IVP and MSVP who might
receive little or no proceeds due to this provision.139
Moreover, the provisions described above might actually increase the
risk for inter-investor conflict. Even with a pay-to-play, investors may
continue to develop divergent opinions regarding the desirability of
financing a company. The provision, however, increases the stakes of these
debates by actively punishing non-participating investors. Likewise, the use
of antidilution protection can turn investor preferences regarding the price at
which a company issues its securities into concrete investor conflicts. In the
case of FormFactor, a stock issuance that resulted in an “antidilution
adjustment” to the Series G Preferred Stock would have effectively diluted
all shares of common stock and preferred stock that did not receive an
adjustment. For MDV and IVP, an antidilution adjustment of the laterissued stock would have resulted in a reduction in the value of their primary
investment in the company’s unprotected Series B and Series C Preferred
Stock. Arguably, MDV and IVP could protect themselves from this risk
through exercising their negotiated veto right over company financings, but
veto rights themselves give rise to the possibility that they might be used
opportunistically. Couldn’t MDV and IVP threaten to use their veto rights
to force a waiver of all or part of the later-stage investors’ preferential
rights?
It was these unresolved potential inter-investor conflicts that laid the
foundation for the unprecedented inter-investor disputes that erupted
following the collapse of the Internet economy.
IV. PATHOLOGICAL VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTMENT: 2001-2003
In the months following the collapse of the Internet economy, a
relatively new investment risk began to concern many venture capitalists:
139
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the fear of suit by other VC investors. Lawsuits against VC investors by
company managers had occurred in the past, but the notion that a VC
investor would bring suit against a co-investor in a start-up company was an
entirely novel phenomenon. The source of this new risk arose from the
flawed nature in which VC investors had traditionally resolved potential
inter-investor conflicts of interest. In particular, the economic climate
encouraged a type of company financing in which VC investors leading the
financing demanded greater preferential rights to protect their economic
interests at the same time that many of the company’s existing VC investors
were significantly constrained in their ability to participate in the financing.
These preferential rights drove a wedge between the interests of those VC
investors who participated and those who did not.
A. The Rise of the “Down-Round” Financing
The year 2001 represented a significant turning point in the VC industry.
The first sign of the new economic climate came with the abrupt halt of the
formerly robust IPO market for start-up companies. Whereas 264 “venturebacked” companies completed an IPO in 2000, by 2001 the number of
venture-backed IPOs fell to 64, which fell further to 24 in 2002.140
Likewise, the number of opportunities for start-up companies to “exit” by
means of a meaningful acquisition also plummeted. Although the annual
number of acquisitions of venture-backed companies was relatively constant
from 2001 through 2002, the aggregate value of these transactions fell from
$68.4 billion in 2000 to $16.8 billion in 2001 to $7.9 billion in 2002. 141
(Figure 2)

Year
2000
2001
2002

Total
Deals
316
353
316

Figure 2: Venture-Backed Liquidity Events by Year
Mergers & Acquisitions
IPOs
Deals with
Total
Total Offer
Disclosed
Disclosed
Average Deal Number
Amount
Values
Value ($M)
Size ($M)
of IPOs
($M)
202
$68,353.1
$338.4
264
$25,499.4
165
$16,798.9
$101.8
41
$3,489.9
151
$7,874.4
$52.1
24
$2,473.5

Given the diminished opportunities for start-up companies to seek
financing through an IPO or acquisition, companies sought financing
primarily through VC investment. Yet, after years of record investment
levels, VC investors quickly began to return to “pre-bubble” investment
trends. In contrast to the 7,832 VC investments made in 2000 (representing
a total of $104 billion invested), VC investors made only 4,451 investments
in 2001 (representing a total of $40 billion invested) and 3,042 investments
140
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in 2002 (representing a total of $21.5 billion).142 Significantly, for most VC
investors, the bulk of these investments represented follow-on investments
in existing portfolio companies rather than first-time investments in other
start-up companies. 143 VC investors attributed their reluctance to make new
first-time investments to the need to engage in time-consuming “portfolio
triage”—the resuscitation of failed business plans and the restructuring of
company cash-flow needs.144 For start-up companies seeking financing,
finding a new VC investor to lead a financing became increasingly difficult,
requiring many companies to turn to their existing VC investors for
continued funding.
Even when a start-up company could secure VC investment—whether
from existing investors or from an outside investor—the terms were likely
to be severe. The run-up in IPO valuations during the “bubble years” of
1999 and 2000 was accompanied by a concomitant run-up in the valuations
of private start-up companies. 145 After 2000, VC investments in established
start-up companies represented a marked departure from this trend. Most
were completed at a significantly lower valuation than a company’s prior
round of financing.146 As a result, the financings ordinarily triggered VC
investors’ antidilution protection.
The resulting dilution of a prospective “down-round” financing often
brought out the divergent interests of a company’s managers and its
multiple VC investors. Consider, for instance, a down-round financing of
NewCo following its Series B financing. Assume that NewCo, in desperate
need for capital, agreed to a $5,000,000 Series C financing at a $15,000,000
valuation. Assume further that EarlyFund and LaterFund each agreed to
purchase their pro-rata share in the financing Ordinarily, the holders of
common stock (presumably management) would see their equity stake in
NewCo shrink from 50% to 37.5%, while EarlyFund and LaterFund would
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see their stakes remain the same at 33.3% and 16.7%, respectively. 147
However, because the financing would trigger the Series A and Series B
antidilution protection, the equity stake of the common stock would actually
be reduced to 34.9%, while the equity stakes of EarlyFund and LaterFund
would increase to 34.3% and 18.2%, respectively.148 Even among
EarlyFund and LaterFund, the down-round financing would be more costly
to EarlyFund than to LaterFund due to their different security ownership.
Although both the Series A Preferred Stock and the Series B Preferred
Stock would receive an antidilution adjustment, the higher-cost Series B
Preferred Stock would receive a greater adjustment than the lower-cost
Series A Preferred Stock.149 As a result, following the antidilution
adjustments, the percentage increase in LaterFund’s equity stake would be
6% more than the increase in EarlyFund’s equity stake.150
“Down-round” financings also included a number of preferential terms
that accentuated the potential conflict between participating VC investors,
non-participating VC investors and management. As Figure 3 shows,151 VC
investors often demanded a variety of preferential rights in down-round
financings to preserve “as much of an economic interest in the company as
possible after a subsequent round at a lower valuation … at the expense of
junior preferred holders, common shareholders and option holders.”152
First, VC investors increasingly demanded preferred stock having a
multiple, senior liquidation preference, often with multiples of up to three or
four times the original investment cost.153 VC investors also purchased
more “participating” convertible preferred stock in lieu of traditional
convertible preferred stock. As noted above, traditional preferred stock
entitles a holder to a preferential payment upon a liquidation or acquisition
147
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of a start-up company, but no more. In order for a holder to receive more
than its stated liquidation preference, the holder must convert its preferred
stock into common stock. In contrast, “participating” convertible preferred
stock permits a preferred stockholder to receive the stated liquidation
preference and, thereafter, share (or “participate”) in the proceeds payable
on shares of the company’s common stock without any need for the holder
to convert into common stock. These preferential terms allowed VC
investors the opportunity to realize significant returns on their investment
should a start-up company be acquired even at the prevailing acquisition
values. The downside was that after payment of the preferred stock
liquidation preferences, there was often little left to split among the
“participating” preferred stock, the junior-ranking preferred stock and the
common stock.154
Figure 3: Venture Capital Financing Terms (2002-2004)
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VC investors also demanded stronger forms of antidilution protection.
In particular, VC investors increasingly purchased securities with “fullratchet” antidilution protection rather than the historic industry-standard
“weighted-average” antidilution protection.155 Full-ratchet antidilution
protection effectively “re-prices” the protected preferred stock to the price
of any future, lower-priced issuance. 156 Indeed, under most formulations,
the issuance of even a single share of lower-priced stock requires re-pricing
all protected preferred stock to the lower price. The result is in stark
154
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contrast to “weighted-average” formulas which re-price protected preferred
stock based on the price and quantity of the new issuance. As a result, a
future down-round financing could create significant conflicts between VC
investors holding shares of preferred stock with full-ratchet antidilution
protection and those stockholders who held unprotected securities or
securities having more mild forms of antidilution protection. Imagine, for
example, that LaterFund had received full-ratchet antidilution protection in
the Series B financing of NewCo. Assuming NewCo completed a
$5,000,000 Series C financing at a $15,000,000 valuation, the Series B fullratchet antidilution protection would have resulted in LaterFund becoming
the largest shareholder of NewCo—even with full pro-rata participation by
both LaterFund and EarlyFund. Specifically, LaterFund’s equity stake
would have increased from 16.7% to 37.5%, while EarlyFund’s equity stake
would have increased from 33.3% to only 35.7%.
Lastly, many down-round financings involved a related recapitalization,
often with significant adverse changes to the terms of existing preferred
stock. In many cases, a recapitalization of a company’s existing preferred
stock was necessary due to the triggering of preferred stock antidilution
protection. Companies that raised capital at high valuations during the late
1990s found that raising capital at lower valuations during the ensuing
economic recession might trigger an “antidilution death spiral,” particularly
where a company had issued stock with ratchet antidilution protection.157 In
these instances, the antidilution adjustments required such significant
adjustments to the common stock conversion rates of the protected preferred
stock that it was mathematically impossible to honor the antidilution
protection at particular valuations.158 The only possibility for completing a
financing at the specified valuation was to restructure the preferred stock.
At the same time, VC investors recognized the adverse effect that a
down-round financing could have on the financial incentives of company
managers. The significant dilution resulting from the drop in a company’s
valuation—especially when combined with investors’ antidilution
protection—often left common stockholders with no meaningful equity
stake. 159 The large liquidation preferences demanded by VC investors
compounded the problem. Most managers were aware that the most likely
liquidity event during this period was through an acquisition. But given the
depressed acquisition valuations of start-up companies, investors’ aggregate
liquidation preferences threatened to absorb most, if not all, of the probable
acquisition proceeds. 160 Thus, to make a company “fundable,” a company’s
existing VC investors often had to agree to a reduction of existing
liquidation preferences or even the conversion of some or all of their
157
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preferred stock into common stock.161 In many cases, existing VC investors
consented to these adverse changes in hopes of recouping their investment
in the company through the rights of the newly issued securities. For many
investors, however, the adverse changes were forced upon them due to
insufficient veto rights or the existence of a pay-to-play provision.162
Arguably, to the extent all existing VC investors participated in these
financings, many conflicts might be diminished given that all investors
would receive the new preferential rights. A principal challenge for a
down-round financing, however, was that not all VC investors could—or
would—participate in it. For many early backers of a company, the
capital/time investment constraint prevented them from investing more in
the company.163 In other cases, VC investors simply appear to have been
reluctant to “throw good money after bad.” As one venture capitalist
remarked in 2002, “[o]ur position is that, if financing will not last the
company one year, and if the company is not profitable after that, we will
not invest. You have to make tough decisions in this environment, and
sometimes you just have to walk.”164
Not surprisingly, the rise of down-round financings quickly exposed the
latent inter-investor conflicts arising from the combination of staged
financing and investment syndication. Negotiations between a company’s
participating and non-participating investors over “how to split the
equity”165 were difficult owing to the presence of investors’ reciprocal veto
rights. Commenting on the rise of down-round financings, the Venture
Capital Journal began a series of stories detailing the challenges of these
financings, noting “new investors structuring protective measures and lower
valuations into the term sheet are pushing existing venture backers into
defensive positions, forcing some to dig in their heels….”166 In some cases,
the prevalence of reciprocal veto rights could give rise to strategic behavior
among investors. A story of one such negotiation recounted by a prominent
VC attorney illustrates the holdup potential of investors’ veto rights:
The case I am citing involved a shareholder exercising veto rights
over a salvage round of financing, one the company needed in order
to survive. Through negative covenants in that shareholder’s
particular series of preferred stock, the shareholder in question was
demanding special consideration, in this case cash, to surrender the
veto right … even though the shareholder had no plans to participate
(although invited) in the salvage round. 167
161

Curtis Mo, Recent Trends in Venture Capital Financing Terms, in 35TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON
SECURITIES REGULATION 193, 221-22 (Practicing Law Inst. Course Handbook Series No. 1396, 2003).
162
See Joan Lesser & Carrie Johnson, Financing Troubled Companies: Highly Dilutive (Down Round)
Financings, COMP. I NT. LAW. (January 2003).
163
See supra notes 101-103.
164
John Ince, Where Is the Money, UPSIDE, May 20, 2002 (quoting general partner of SI Ventures).
165
Fellers, supra note 80.
166
Brauschweig, supra note 155.
167
Bartlett, supra note 134, at 34.

MANAGING RISK ON A $25 MILLION BET

41

That participating and non-participating investors alike often had
representatives on a company’s board of directors further complicated
matters. The conflict of interest among investors concerning a down-round
financing raised difficult questions regarding the board’s fiduciary duties
and the fairness of approving a “down round” financing. Directors
representing VC investors who would be participating in the financing had a
“financial interest” in the transaction,168 requiring careful procedural
precautions in order to discharge the director’s duty of loyalty.169 Lawyers
representing companies undergoing a down-round financing were quick to
qualify once standard legal opinions concerning the enforceability of the
transaction documents and to exclude entirely any opinions regarding the
board’s compliance with its fiduciary duties. 170 A board’s approval of a
company’s acquisition during this time likewise required the ability to
navigate among conflicting investor interests. As one attorney notes, in the
event of a sale, directors will need to examine not only the distribution of
acquisition proceeds between preferred stockholders and common
stockholders, but also “how … the conflict of interest [is] affected if the
preferred stockholders themselves have differing economic interests—e.g.,
if one venture fund is senior in its liquidation preferences to the others, such
that the most senior venture fund receives the vast majority of the
liquidation distributions.”171
In sum, the down-round financings of 2001-2003 exposed not only the
prevalence of inter-investor conflicts of interest but also the imperfections
of the prevailing methods of containing them. Not surprisingly, warnings
quickly became commonplace in the VC industry that the “potential for
liability [for VC investors] in downrounds is very real and … the risks do
not go away once the financing is completed.”172
B. The Realization of Conflict:
Benchmark Capital Partners IV, L.P. v. Vague
In the summer of 2002, the potential intensity of inter-investor conflict
became vividly public in Benchmark Capital Partners IV, L.P. v. Vague. 173
As noted earlier, the case arose from an attempt by Benchmark Capital to
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enjoin one of its start-up companies, Juniper Financial Corp., and a coinvestor in the company, the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce
(“CIBC”), from consummating a down-round financing of Juniper.
Although the case has received some scholarly attention,174 no one has yet
examined why syndicated VC investment in Juniper should have resulted in
such disastrous consequences. As the analysis below demonstrates, the case
was fundamentally the result of Benchmark and CIBC implementing the
strategies outlined in Part II in an economic environment that accentuated
the potential inter-investor conflict these strategies can create. At the same
time, Benchmark lacked the veto power it believed it had secured to keep
this conflict in check.
In many ways, the history of Benchmark’s investment in Juniper was
representative of the VC investment strategies described in Part II(A). As
an early-stage investor, Benchmark made its initial $20 million investment
in Juniper shortly after Juniper’s incorporation in January 2000 as an on-line
bank. 175 Typical of VC investment, Benchmark acquired shares of Series A
Preferred Stock and received a number of control and monitoring rights,
most notably representation on the company’s board of directors as well as
several stockholder veto rights.176 Benchmark also engaged in staged
financing and syndication. When Juniper next needed capital in September
2000, Benchmark helped arrange a $95.5 million Series B financing to be
led by another investor, J&W Seligman, and further agreed to invest $5
million in it. When Juniper required additional capital the following year,
Benchmark again assisted the company by approving a $145 million Series
C financing. In contrast to the Series B financing, however, Juniper raised
the full $145 million without participation by Benchmark, selling all shares
of Series C Preferred Stock to CIBC.177
Like Benchmark, CIBC also engaged in the VC investment strategies
outlined in Part II(A). First, as the company’s largest VC investor, CIBC
demanded the right to select six of the eleven members of Juniper’s board of
directors. CIBC also obtained majority voting power of the company
through its purchase of the Series C Preferred Stock, although exercise of
this power would be subject to the Series A and Series B stockholder veto
rights. Benchmark and Seligman, no doubt aware of the potential interinvestor conflicts that might arise with CIBC, had approved the Series C
financing on the condition of retaining these reciprocal veto rights.
Although CIBC appeared to accept this arrangement, it did demand an
important concession from the existing stockholders. Specifically, it
obtained the right to waive these veto rights, provided the waiver did not
174
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“diminish or alter the liquidation preference or other financial or economic
rights” of the Series A Preferred Stock or Series B Preferred Stock.178 In
addition to CIBC’s control rights, the terms of the Series C Preferred Stock
contained a number of beneficial economic rights, such as a senior
liquidation preference and “full ratchet” antidilution protection.179 As
described in Part IV(A), these preferential rights might harm the interests of
Benchmark and Seligman, but they appear to have consented to the terms on
the assumption that the Series C financing would be the company’s final
round of equity financing. 180
Unfortunately for Benchmark and Seligman, this proved to be a
disastrous assumption. Notwithstanding the size of the Series C financing,
Juniper notified its investors in early 2002 that even more capital would be
required to sustain the company. 181 The significant capital needs of Juniper
stemmed largely from federal banking regulations that required the
company to maintain a “well-capitalized” status. Failure to do so could
result in the company becoming subject to a number of regulatory remedies,
such as the loss of the right to issue Visa cards, which represented the
company’s primary line of business.182 With the assistance of an investment
banking firm, Juniper sought financing from a number of outside VC firms
as well as from its existing investors. Ultimately, however, these efforts
were unsuccessful except with respect to CIBC which proposed a $50
million Series D financing.
The proposed financing from CIBC was a down-round financing that
would result in a number of adverse consequences to the Series A and
Series B Preferred Stock. First, the Series D Preferred Stock would be
issued at a discounted price, triggering CIBC’s ratchet antidilution
protection.183 As a result, CIBC would hold more than 90% of Juniper’s
voting power following the financing while the collective equity interests of
the Series A and Series B Preferred Stock would drop from 29% to 7%. 184
Second, the Series D Preferred Stock would rank senior to the Series A and
Series B Preferred Stock in terms of liquidation rights, redemption rights
and dividend rights. Given that the Series C Preferred Stock was also senior
to the Series A and Series B Preferred Stock, Benchmark and Seligman
would receive nothing in an acquisition of the company unless the
consideration was sufficient to satisfy $195 million of Series C and Series D
liquidation preferences. In addition, the proposal also required the
recapitalization of the company’s Series A and Series B Preferred Stock to
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reduce the aggregate liquidation preference on these shares from $115
million to $15 million.185
Not surprisingly, Benchmark objected to the proposal. Arguing that
Juniper’s financial problems could be solved through further cost
reductions, Benchmark sought to prevent the financing by exercising its
stockholder veto rights. Many of the terms of the proposed financing
appeared to fall within the scope of Benchmark’s retained veto rights. Both
the Series A and Series B Preferred Stock were entitled to a class vote on
corporate actions that would “[m]aterially adversely change the rights,
preferences and privileges” of the relevant series of preferred stock.186 In
addition, the Series A and Series B stockholders also held a class veto over
the authorization or issuance of “any other equity security … senior to or on
a parity with the Series A Preferred Stock or Series B Preferred Stock as to
dividend rights or redemption rights, voting rights or liquidation
preferences….”187
Recognizing Benchmark’s veto rights, CIBC and Juniper sought to
avoid a Benchmark vote by completing the authorization of the financing
and the preferred stock recapitalization through a merger of Juniper with a
wholly-owned subsidiary. Under section 251 of the Delaware General
Corporation Law, a merger could be used to modify Juniper’s charter
documents,188 and CIBC and Juniper contended that the Series A and Series
B veto rights applied only to modifications of the preferred stock through a
direct amendment of the company’s charter. Although the Series A and
Series B Preferred Stock held a class veto right over a merger of Juniper, a
merger with a wholly-owned subsidiary was specifically excluded from the
veto right. Once the merger was completed, Juniper would then issue the
newly-authorized Series D Preferred Stock to CIBC.
Benchmark filed suit to enjoin the merger and the subsequent issuance
of the Series D Preferred Stock. Its case rested on two distinct arguments.
First, Benchmark argued that the merger would violate the Series A and
Series B veto rights because the merger was a corporate action that
“materially adversely change[d] the rights, preferences and privileges” of
the Series A and Series B Preferred Stock. 189 Second, both the merger—by
authorizing the Series D Preferred Stock—and the company’s execution of
a stock purchase agreement obligating itself to issue the Series D Preferred
Stock violated Benchmark’s veto rights over the authorization or issuance
of a senior security. 190 Benchmark acknowledged that CIBC had the
authority to waive these veto rights; however, it argued that pursuant to its
agreement with CIBC, a waiver was prohibited if it would “diminish or alter
the liquidation preference or other financial or economic rights” of the
185

See id. at *5 n. 20.
Id. at *1.
187
Id. at *3.
188
See DEL. C ODE ANN. tit. 8, 251(b) (2002).
189
Id. at *7.
190
See id. at *9.
186

MANAGING RISK ON A $25 MILLION BET

45

Series A or Series B Preferred Stock. 191 Because the merger and the
issuance of the senior Series D Preferred Stock diminished the economic
rights of the Series A and Series B Preferred Stock, the wavier could not
apply.
These arguments were rejected in an opinion written by Vice Chancellor
Noble. With respect to Benchmark’s first argument, Vice Chancellor Noble
noted that Benchmark’s challenge was confronted by “a long line of
Delaware cases” holding that “protective provisions drafted to provide a
class of preferred stock with a class vote before those shares’ rights,
preferences and privileges may be altered or modified do not fulfill their
apparent purpose of assuring a class vote if adverse consequences flow from
a merger and the protective provisions do not expressly afford protection
against a merger.”192 Had Benchmark intended the veto rights to cover
material adverse changes accomplished through a merger, Benchmark
should have added this restriction. As a consequence, the court concluded,
“to the extent that the merger adversely affects the rights, preferences and
privileges of either the Series A Preferred or Series B Preferred Stock, those
consequences are the product of a merger, a corporate event which the
drafters of the protective provision could have addressed, but did not.”193
The recapitalization of the Series A and Series B Preferred Stock could
therefore proceed without a class vote.
The court similarly rejected Benchmark’s challenge to the authorization
and issuance of the Series D Preferred Stock. The court acknowledged that
the class veto right over authorization of senior securities did not implicate
the distinction between direct modification to preferred stock accomplished
through charter amendment and indirect modifications effected through
merger; however, it concluded that the use of a merger to authorize the
Series D Preferred Stock was nonetheless fatal to Benchmark’s challenge.
The court cited established concerns with reading “general language”
concerning preferred stock voting rights to require a class vote on a merger
and its “integral and accompanying modifications to the corporate charter
and the corporation’s capital structure” where none was intended. 194 Rather,
the court concluded that “[t]o protect against the potential negative effects
of a merger, those who draft protective provisions have been instructed to
make clear that those protective provisions specifically and directly limit the
mischief that can otherwise be accomplished through a merger under 8 Del.
C. § 251.”195
The court’s concern with creating inadvertent veto rights also led it to
reject Benchmark’s argument that CIBC had no authority to waive its right
to veto the issuance of the Series D Preferred Stock. Because the issuance
was not accomplished through the merger, Benchmark’s veto right over
191
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issuances of senior securities would apply unless CIBC could waive it. The
court, however, accepted CIBC’s argument that the simple issuance of a
senior security by Juniper did not diminish the “financial or economic
rights” of the Series A and Series B Preferred Stock, thereby entitling CIBC
to waive the veto right. Although the court admitted that the scope of the
wavier was ambiguous, it reasoned that “where (at least) an ambiguity
exists, our law requires that it be resolved against creating the
preference.”196 CIBC and Juniper could therefore complete the proposed
Series D financing notwithstanding its adverse economic effect on
Benchmark and Seligman.
V. RECONSIDERING BENCHMARK, PREFERRED STOCK AND MODERN
CORPORATE SCHOLARSHIP
By demonstrating the potential intensity of inter-investor conflict, the
Benchmark lawsuit quickly became one of the most well-known legal
disputes concerning the VC industry. For journalists seeking to examine the
implications of the “dot-com meltdown,” the case represented a symbolic
shift in the operations of the VC market. The Wall Street Journal
interpreted the case as a concrete example of the “tensions … appearing in
the once-clubby world of venture capital as investors fight to wring value
from troubled investments made during the Internet bubble.”197 For VC
investors and their lawyers, the case represented an important cautionary
tale of a VC firm that failed to protect itself against the risk of inter-investor
conflict. For them, the lesson to be learned from Benchmark was clear: VC
investors should draft better protective provisions.198
Outside the context of VC investment, however, the Benchmark case has
received only scant attention. This is unfortunate, for there are broader
lessons to be drawn from the case. First, the case clearly demonstrates the
manner in which VC investors seek to utilize preferred stock to manage
contractually inter-investor conflicts. As such, it suggests the need for a
reconsideration of the Benchmark court’s refusal to apply ordinary contract
principles in interpreting the terms of Benchmark’s preferred stock rights.
Second, the conflict between Benchmark and CIBC provides a concrete
illustration of the dynamic agency costs confronted by VC investors. By
seeking to control investor-manager agency risk, Benchmark and CIBC
created a dimension of inter-investor agency risk that ultimately created the
conflict underlying the lawsuit. In so doing, Benchmark emphasizes the
need to advance a theory of the firm capable of accounting for the dynamic
development of multi-dimensional agency problems within a firm.
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A. The Contractual Nature of Preferred Stock Rights
Although journalistic accounts of Benchmark focused on the rise of
inter-investor “tensions” following the dot-com meltdown, the existence of
inter-investor conflict was hardly a new development. As discussed in Part
III, the potential for inter-investor conflict is an endemic feature of VC
investment owing to staged investment and investment syndication. Nor
was it particularly novel that a controlling shareholder in a private
corporation should engage in allegedly rent-seeking behavior at the expense
of Benchmark, a non-controlling shareholder. The American history of the
private corporation is replete with stories of minority shareholder
“oppression.”199
Indeed, in this light perhaps the most intriguing question about
Benchmark isn’t “why did the lawsuit occur?” but “why aren’t there more
lawsuits like it?” This is particularly true of the period following 2001
when inter-investor tensions were especially pronounced. Yet public
disputes—let alone lawsuits—among VC investors have remained
exceedingly rare. Although several inter-investor lawsuits have arisen since
2002, the number of lawsuits is surprisingly small relative to the number of
down-round financings. 200 Moreover, the small number of lawsuits is in
marked contrast to the dire warnings during the 2001-2003 economic
downturn concerning the potential legal liability for VC investors
participating in down-round financings.201 What explains the dearth of
inter-investor disputes?
One potential answer to this question is that VC investing is
fundamentally a species of relational contracting. As such, VC investors
presumably rely on reputational sanctions to deter both rent-seeking actions
by controlling investors as well as lawsuits by non-controlling investors. It
is commonly argued that a VC firm’s concern about preserving its
reputation for fair dealing among managers of start-up companies constrains
its willingness to act opportunistically towards management.202 It might
therefore be supposed that a similar dynamic constrains one VC investor
from acting opportunistically towards another investor.203 Under this
199
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theory, a VC investor who acts “aggressively” towards another investor may
develop a tarnished reputation among fellow investors as untrustworthy and
opportunistic. As a consequence, the investor might receive fewer
invitations to participate in promising start-up companies, which will
ultimately harm the firm’s financial performance. Thus, a VC investor’s
desire for “deal flow” may create an incentive for developing a reputation
for fair-dealing and non-litigiousness within the VC community.
While there is evidence that reputational concerns do encourage
cooperative behavior among VC investors,204 they cannot entirely explain
the resilience of this cooperation. The significant growth of the VC industry
over the past decade makes it unlikely that the VC community resembles
those communities where norm-based reputational sanctions have come to
displace legal sanctions.205 At the same time, the growth of the industry
during the 1990s followed by the ensuing economic downturn accentuated
the tension between short-term financial gain and long-term deal-flow.
With the growth of the industry, VC firms have raised larger investment
funds, causing the size of individual investments to increase significantly. 206
With greater amounts of capital at stake in each start-up company, the
incentive to protect these investments in the face of the significant interinvestor conflicts outlined in Parts III and IV undoubtedly strained any
reputational incentives promoting cooperation.207 This appears to have been
precisely the case in Benchmark—not only did CIBC negotiate provisions
that accentuated the conflict with Benchmark, but each of CIBC and
Benchmark invested considerable sums in Juniper.
In these situations, an investor—no longer able to rely on reputational
incentives to constrain rent-seeking behavior—must instead rely on
204
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negotiated contract provisions to minimize the risks posed by inter-investor
conflicts. Of particular importance in this regard are the veto rights—or
quasi-veto rights (such as liquidation preferences and anti-dilution rights)—
described in Part III. These rights protect a VC investor against corporate
actions adverse to its particular economic interests. Indeed, a tremendous
amount of practitioner commentary following Benchmark focused on
advising VC firms on how to avoid loopholes in their protective provisions,
underscoring the importance of these veto rights within the VC industry.208
That these veto rights are drafted as preferred stock rights should in no
way diminish their fundamentally contractual nature as agreements among a
company’s VC investors. The one document a company’s VC investors are
likely to read carefully—the non-binding term sheet—often lumps the
allocation of investor veto rights under a general heading entitled
“Protective Provisions.”209 In turning the term sheet into VC contracts,
most of these veto rights are set forth in the company’s charter as preferred
stock rights, although many may also appear in other, more explicitly
“contractual” documents, such as the Investor’s Rights Agreement or the
The decision ordinarily turns on issues of
Voting Agreement. 210
practicality, such as whether the veto right should be controlled by vote of a
particular VC investor’s board designee or by a particular group of preferred
stockholders.211
In virtually all cases, investors’ veto-rights are allocated not to
individually named VC investors but to particular series of preferred
stock.212 The use of reciprocal veto rights to control inter-investor conflict
would pose an especially acute risk of investor hold-ups were each VC
investor to receive separate veto-rights. Allocating rights based on
preferred stock ownership diminishes this risk. As discussed in Part III,
inter-investor conflicts arise from the fact that a company’s VC investors
208
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purchase securities issued at different times and different prices. By
creating a new series of preferred stock at each issuance, a company and its
VC investors create a means by which to group investors whose economic
interests should generally be aligned. Allocating investor rights by series of
preferred stock therefore allows each group of investors having similar
economic interests to protect their collective interests while diminishing the
risk that any one investor can engage in rent-seeking behavior through
opportunistically exercising a veto right.213
In short, VC investors have few legal disputes because, when
reputational incentives for cooperation fail, they have negotiated an
elaborate set of contracts to address the risk of inter-investor conflict.
Considered in this light, a primary failure of the Benchmark opinion—and
of Delaware corporate jurisprudence in general—is the refusal to apply
ordinary contract principles in interpreting the terms of preferred stock
rights. To be sure, Delaware courts do recognize the contractual nature of
the rights set forth in a company’s certificate of incorporation. As the
Benchmark court noted,
[c]ertificates of incorporation define contractual relationships not
only among the corporation and its stockholders but also among the
stockholders. Thus, [Juniper’s] Certificate defines, as a matter of
contract, both the relationship between Benchmark and Juniper and
the relative relationship between Benchmark, as a holder of junior
preferred stock, and CIBC, as the holder of senior preferred stock.
For these reasons, courts look to general principles of contract
construction in construing certificates of incorporation.214
In ascertaining the scope of preferred stock rights, however, the court
cited a further Delaware principle concerning preferred stock. According to
this principle, a court’s function in interpreting the rights of preferred
stockholders
is essentially one of contract interpretation against the background
of Delaware precedent. These precedential parameters are simply
stated: Any rights, preferences and limitations of preferred stock
that distinguish that stock from common stock must be expressly
and clearly stated, as provided by statute. Therefore, these rights,
preferences and liquidations will not be presumed or implied.215
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Although these “precedential parameters” would seem to apply only to the
“rights, preferences and limitations of preferred stock that distinguish that
stock from common stock,” Judge Noble had little difficult summarily
concluding that “[t]hese principles also apply in construing the relative
rights of holders of different series of preferred stock.”216
Armed with this principle, Judge Noble thus disposed of Benchmark’s
workmanlike attempt to interpret its preferred stock using ordinary contract
principles. As noted above, Benchmark focused on the broad wording of its
veto power to conclude that it held a veto right over Juniper’s proposed
merger—a corporate action that would seem to “materially adversely
change the rights, preferences and privileges” of the Series A and Series B
Preferred Stock.217 Although this straight-forward analysis might satisfy a
Delaware court interpreting an ordinary contract,218 the problem for
Benchmark was the need to interpret the veto against the “background of
Delaware precedent.” This precedent includes Warner Communications,
Inc. v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc.,219 which concluded that a veto right over
adverse modifications to preferred stock rights does not apply if the adverse
modifications result from a merger and the veto right does not expressly
afford protection against a merger.
Yet while Warner may have been fatal to Benchmark’s attempt to veto
the merger of Juniper, Warner did not dictate the outcome of Benchmark’s
other contract arguments concerning its right to veto the authorization and
issuance of the Series D Preferred Stock. With regard to the authorization
of the Series D Preferred Stock, Juniper’s charter gave Benchmark the right
to veto its “authorization” regardless of whether it was created by Juniper’s
merger or otherwise. Judge Noble, however, refused to read this veto right
generally based on established Delaware precedent that protective rights
“must … be clearly expressed and will not be presumed.”220 With regard to
Benchmark’s attempt to veto the issuance of the Series D Preferred Stock,
Judge Noble likewise turned to this interpretive principle to address the
argument. As noted earlier, the primary issue was whether the issuance
would “diminish or alter the financial and economic rights” of the Series A
and Series B Preferred Stock. Judge Noble conceded that an ambiguity
existed in the meaning of this language and that it could “easily be given the
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broad interpretation suggested by Benchmark.”221 He ultimately concluded,
however, that “[t]o adopt [Benchmark’s] position would amount to
presuming a preferential voting right. In the present case, however, where
(at least) an ambiguity exists, our law requires that it be resolved against
creating the preference.”222
One might expect that given the importance of this preferred stock
presumption in Benchmark, it would have a precedential pedigree of
unquestionable authority. Even a cursory analysis of its historical roots,
however, reveals the presumption to be primarily a judicial enshrinement of
specious dicta contained in a 1930 Delaware Chancery Court decision,
Pennington v. Commonwealth Hotel Construction Co.223 In Pennington, the
receiver of a liquidated corporation requested the Delaware Chancery Court
to determine the proper allocation of the corporation’s remaining assets
between its common and preferred stockholders. The corporation’s charter
provided that in the event of its liquidation, the preferred holders were to
receive before the common holders the “par value [of such preferred stock],
and all unpaid dividends accrued thereon.”224 At issue was whether the
liquidated corporation could pay preferred stockholders their unpaid
accrued dividends that were specified in the charter when it had never
turned a profit and no capital surplus existed. The court recognized that the
charter essentially represented a contractual agreement between the
preferred stockholders and common stockholders over the distribution of
liquidation proceeds and proceeded to “consider the question as solely one
of contract between the common owners of a fund.”225 In what can only be
described as a tortured interpretation of the charter, the court concluded that
the phrase “unpaid dividends accrued thereon” meant only those dividends
that would have been payable out of net profits or surplus while the
company was a going concern but went unpaid for some reason. 226
Not content with this contractual interpretation, the court added in dicta,
The general rule is that preferred stock enjoys only those
preferences which are specifically defined and that as to all matters
lying outside the field of defined preferences, preferred stock has
no rights which are not shared equally with the common stock.
Hence if dividends in arrear are not made a specific charge on the
assets representing capital paid in, they cannot be paid out of such
assets on liquidation. 227
In support of this proposition, the court cited a 1929 chancery court opinion,
Gaskill v. Gladys Belle Oil Co.228 Only the loosest read of Gaskill,
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however, could support this broad pronunciation. Gaskill concerned the
narrow issue of whether the rights of preferred stock could be set forth in a
corporation’s bylaws as opposed to its charter. The chancery court in
Gaskill focused primarily on Section 13 of the Delaware corporate statute of
1919 which provided that “[e]very corporation shall have power to create
two or more classes of stock, with such designations, preferences and voting
power, or restrictions or qualifications thereof, as shall be stated and
expressed in the Certificate of Incorporation.”229 Given this language, the
Gaskill court concluded that the preferred stock rights should have been set
forth in the charter and not the bylaws.230
Nothing in Gaskill suggests that, had these rights been expressed in the
charter, it would have applied anything other than ordinary contract
principles in interpreting them. 231 Nonetheless, Pennington became the first
of a long line of cases to place a broad judicial gloss on Gaskill. By 1937,
Gaskill was construed to require that preferred stock rights not only be
expressed in the charter, but “clearly” expressed;232 and by 1943, Gaskill
and its progeny required that preferred stock rights “must be strictly
construed.”233 This doctrine of “strict construction” continued until 1998
when the Delaware Supreme Court disapproved the continued use of the
phrase.234 The court nonetheless continued to endorse the rule that preferred
stock rights be “clearly expressed and will not be presumed”235—an
approach that, as seen in Benchmark, can operate as strict construction in
everything but name.
Analysis of the policy reasons for the development of this interpretive
principle of preferred stock only further weakens its doctrinal validity.
Pennington, like Gaskill, involved a dispute between common and preferred
stockholders over the distribution of a liquidated company’s assets.
Understanding this historical context is critical, for this type of dispute was
a common one in the early years of preferred stock and significantly colored
courts’ analysis of preferred stock rights. Gaskill, for instance, relied
heavily on a line of New Jersey and English cases involving similar disputes
between common and preferred stockholders over the distribution of a
liquidated company’s assets. These cases held that “with respect to capital
[paid in] all outstanding stock, whatever its source, is entitled, in the
absence of statute or of a contract provision to the contrary, to a ratable
participation in the distribution of the capital to which all have
contributed.”236
229
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In essence, these cases articulated a default rule of equal sharing for
preferred stock and common stock in liquidation scenarios. It is against this
backdrop that one must interpret subsequent statements by Delaware courts
that “all stock enjoys equal rights and privileges, and that claims for special
preferences must be clearly provided by the charter contract. Such was in
effect the holding of Gaskill v. Gladys Belle Oil Co.”237 To the extent
courts use this language to support a general rule of narrow construction of
preferred stock rights, they give Gaskill a life entirely separate from its
original policy rationale of specifying how preferred stockholders could opt
out of an equal-sharing default rule on corporate liquidations.
Nor does the one policy consideration advanced by contemporary
Delaware courts create a satisfactory rationale for a narrow construction of
preferred stock rights. As the Delaware Supreme Court stated in Elliot
Associates, L.P. v. Avatex Corp.,238 the interpretive principle of requiring
preferred stock rights to be clearly expressed “continues a coherent and
rational approach to corporate finance.”239 Corporate drafters seeking to
create preferred stock veto rights need look only to the language used in
Avatex for an example of a sufficiently “clear” veto right covering adverse
changes effected through a merger.240 Judge Noble likewise expressed
reluctance “to create uncertainty in a complex area where Avatex has set
down a framework for consistency.”241 Yet Avatex provides clarity in only
one narrowly-defined context. It says nothing about how preferred
stockholders can draft with sufficient clarity the multitude of other rights
they might seek. Under the logic of Avatex, preferred stockholders must
remain uncertain of the legal effect of these “untested” rights until a court
has approved a particular expression as sufficiently clear. In this regard, it
can hardly be surprising that commentary within the VC industry following
Benchmark expressed concern regarding the enforceability of other
customary preferred stock terms.242 Indeed, the fact that the Delaware
Supreme Court felt compelled to provide a “path for future drafters” at all is
itself a testament to the systemic uncertainties created by the prevailing
preferred stock interpretive principles.
Thus, there are neither doctrinal nor policy reasons for treating the
complex contractual arrangement negotiated by CIBC, Juniper and
Benchmark as something other than “contractual.” Using both preferred
stock and standard contract provisions, CIBC and Benchmark did exactly
what financial economists predict rational investors do when making an
investment in a private corporation: they sought to protect themselves
237
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through contract against potential agency risks—both those arising from
conflicts with managers and those arising from conflicts with one another.
To the extent investors use preferred stock to express these rights, the
Delaware principle of narrow construction burdens these contractual rights
in an unexpected and potentially costly way for investors. Likewise for
entrepreneurs, the enhanced investment risk faced by VC investors must
inevitably lead to a higher cost of capital for firms seeking VC financing.243
Admittedly, resorting to ordinary contract principles to interpret
preferred stock rights will hardly eliminate the risk that contractual
provisions may fail to have their intended effect. Contracts are inherently
incomplete and no contract can protect against all potential agency risks. 244
By forsaking the narrow construction doctrine, however, Delaware courts
can ensure that the same gap-filling measures apply to all investor contract
provisions regardless of the type of document that contains them. In the
context of venture capital, this result would permit VC investors to continue
to use preferred stock as their security of choice without the attendant risks
associated with the prevailing preferred stock interpretive principles.
B. Benchmark, Corporate Scholarship and the Theory of the Firm
Whatever its shortcomings with respect to doctrinal analysis, Benchmark
nevertheless provides a useful illustration of the central thesis of this
Article. The agency risks faced by Benchmark were multiple and complex.
As with most VC investors, Benchmark sought to contain investor-manager
agency risk with Juniper’s management through a variety of investment
techniques, including staging its investments and syndicating it to other VC
investors such as CIBC. In so doing, however, Benchmark ultimately
created a new dimension of inter-investor agency risk when CIBC itself
sought to protect against potential agency problems with Juniper’s
management. Only by appreciating the dynamic formation of these agency
risks is it possible to understand why Benchmark sought to preserve a
separate veto right and why it ultimately sought to exercise it over the Series
D financing. Moreover, as this section shows, the analytical framework
used in this Article provides insight not only into VC investment, but also
into the general character of agency problems in a firm. In this regard, the
story of VC finance highlights the need to move beyond traditional theories
of the firm and toward a theory that is robust to the dynamic character of
multidimensional agency problems.
First, this Article’s emphasis on the presence of both investor-manager
and inter-investor agency problems in VC investment suggests the need to
243
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reassess traditional analytical frameworks that emphasize a unitary
perspective of agency risk within a firm. As discussed previously, a
significant amount of contemporary corporate scholarship concerns itself
with examining the agency problems created by the separation between
management and risk-bearing equity in public corporations.245 One need
look no further than the significant debate concerning the proper internal
governance institutions of firms to see the pervasiveness of this unitary,
one-dimensional framework. In their important work on team-production
and corporate governance, Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout note that a
primary obstacle for their team-production theory is the widespread
acceptance among corporate scholars of what they call the “grand design
principal agent paradigm.”246 As they note, this paradigm has given rise to
two recurring themes in legal scholarship:
First, that the central economic problem addressed by corporation
law is reducing “agency costs” by keeping directors and managers
faithful to shareholders’ interests; and second, that the primary goal
of the public corporation is—or ought to be—maximizing
shareholders’ wealth. 247
At first blush, Blair and Stout’s alternative team-production model
appears to provide a paradigm of the firm that moves beyond this unitary,
one-dimensional framework. In their view, a corporation consists of the
collaborative efforts of multiple participants with potentially conflicting
interests. These participants—including shareholders, employees, and other
stakeholders such as creditors—make firm specific contributions to the
corporation that are difficult to recover once committed.248 Because these
contributions are also likely to be nonseparable from one another, a number
of problems can arise as participants squabble over how to divide any
economic surpluses generated by the team production.249 In general terms,
the “team members” have created a series of agency relationships in which
each participant is a “principal” and must rely on the team as its agent.250
245
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To address the problem of mutual opportunism this creates, team members
voluntarily cede control over the firm and their sunk-cost, firm-specific
investments to an outside party that lacks any direct incentive to take
advantage of team members. In most public corporations, Blair and Stout
argue that this role is filled by the board of directors which acts as a
“mediating hierarch” of the firm to resolve team members’ conflicting
interests.251
Yet even as Blair and Stout assail the traditional “grand design”
paradigm, they continue to rely on a fundamentally unitary perspective of
agency risk—or in their terms, “team production problems.” Team
members are presented as discrete constituents of the corporation with
separate, well-defined interests. For instance, Blair and Stout justify
shareholder voting rights on the basis that shareholders have a
“homogenous interest” in maximizing share price which is often in harmony
with other stakeholders’ interests.252 Likewise, in their paradigm, the board
mediates between the conflicting interests of distinct corporate
constituencies such as “bondholders,” “employees” and “shareholders.”253
This unitary approach towards each corporate constituency is certainly at
odds with the experience of the VC industry where inter-shareholder
conflict is a way of life. Moreover, Benchmark demonstrated that VC
investors will often seek to resolve these conflicts independently of the
board through stockholder voting rights.
Blair and Stout concern
themselves primarily with public corporations, but even in this context, the
interests of corporate constituencies will often be heterogeneous. This is
particularly true for shareholders, who may have private interests that
conflict with the goal of maximizing shareholder value generally or with the
particular interests of certain shareholders.254 Just as in Benchmark, these
private interests may induce influential shareholders to engage in rentseeking behavior that is beyond the domain of the board of director’s
authority to mediate.255 These inter-shareholder agency-problems remain
unexplained by the team-production model, yet they may fundamentally
affect the risk profile of corporate investment.
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In contrast, corporate scholarship concerning close corporations has
generally been better at grappling with the intra-stakeholder conflicts that
can arise among shareholders. As noted above, it is widely agreed that
shareholders in closely held corporations face a high risk of loss from their
fellow shareholders’ opportunism. 256 Moreover, there is general consensus
that the primary constraints on shareholder opportunism—contractual
agreements, reputational constraints, fiduciary duties running from
shareholder to shareholder—are not entirely effective in eliminating this
risk.257 The result is that the risk of inter-shareholder conflict increases the
cost of capital for closely-held firms.258
Yet here, too, the analytical framework underlying most studies of close
corporations fails to account for the multiple dimensions of agency risk
faced by investors in a private company. In particular, investor-manager
agency problems are commonly assumed to be non-existent or significantly
reduced in closely-held corporations.259 The primary exception is, of
course, in the context of VC investment where scholars have focused
exclusively on these agency problems to the exclusion of agency problems
among investors. While this Article has shown the short-comings of the
traditional VC model, the model nevertheless illustrates that investormanager agency problems may play a critical role in closely-held
corporations. By not accounting for them, the standard analytical
framework for close corporations potentially obscures the risks of private
company investment.
In addition, by emphasizing the relationship between investor-manager
agency costs and inter-investor agency costs in VC finance, this Article
highlights the dynamic character of agency problems in a firm. Recall again
that it was Benchmark’s attempt to control investor-manager agency risk
with Juniper’s management through staged financing and syndication that
created the potential for inter-investor agency risk with CIBC. Closely
related to the development of this inter-investor agency risk was the fact
that these investors were VC funds subject to the capital/time investment
constraint and significant investment return incentives. Also related to the
size of this agency risk was the existence of the preferred stock contract
provisions that were negotiated between Benchmark and CIBC—most
importantly, the veto rights retained by Benchmark. An accurate ex ante
256
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assessment of Benchmark’s potential agency risks in investing in Juniper
would have required consideration of the interplay of all of these factors.
The dynamic character of agency costs has important—and
understudied—implications for corporate scholarship.
Traditionally,
agency cost theory has been utilized to determine how agency problems
might increase a firm’s cost of capital. All other things being equal,
investors will demand a higher rate of return as compensation for higher
agency costs.260 The dynamic character of agency problems provides a
further twist to the preceding analysis: not only must an investor account
for the multiple dimensions of agency problems in a firm; she must also
account for any agency problems that will arise when she seeks to address
them (e.g., through bonding or monitoring efforts). Thus, in pricing a startup company investment, a rationale VC investor must consider not only
agency risks with management, but the agency risks that might develop with
other VC investors once she tries to reduce these investor-manager agency
risks. The extent of these inter-investor agency risks, in turn, may be
affected by characteristics of the investors themselves (e.g., are the VC
funds nearing the expiration of their investment terms?) and mechanisms
the VC investor might utilize to reduce these risks (e.g., reciprocal veto
rights). After Benchmark, the enforceability of these mechanisms must also
be considered.
Nor are the dynamic characteristics of agency costs limited to VC
investment. Attempts to reign in investor-manager agency problems born
by public company shareholders might likewise create additional
dimensions of agency conflict for shareholders. Take, for instance, the
argument for increasing institutional investor activism in corporate
governance. In theory, institutional investors should help minimize
investor-manager agency problems in public corporations by taking an
Institutions typically hold larger
active role in corporate governance.261
blocks of shares than individuals and have the resources and incentives to
develop expertise in making and monitoring public company investments.
Moreover, their considerable share holdings should enable them to obtain
directors’ attention and to make changes in a board’s composition when
firm performance lags. Indeed, the desire to reunite “ownership and
control” by deferring to institutional investors has led to several initiatives
to empower institutional investors to fulfill this role, such as the SEC’s
recent proposal to permit shareholders to nominate directors directly and
have their nominees listed in the company’s proxy statement.262
260
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By granting institutional investors more power, the agency costs of
investing in public equities are altered but not necessarily reduced. As
Stephen Bainbridge has noted, institutional investor activism in practice has
fallen far short of its theoretical potential.263 The high costs of activism
have encouraged institutional investors to remain “rationally apathetic”
when it comes to exercising shareholder rights or engaging in active firm
monitoring.264 The exceptions are those shareholders who seek to use
increased shareholder rights to self-deal or to take private benefits from the
corporation that are not shared by other investors. Unions and pensions
plans, for instance, have been particularly active shareholders, even though
their activism often redounds to their private benefit.265 A corporate
investor, too, might seek to use its leverage as a large-block shareholder to
skew a firm’s business decision to obtain a larger share of the firm’s
business—regardless of whether it enhances firm value.266 Lastly, hedge
funds—investment funds that, like VC funds, have capital/time investment
constraints and significant investment return incentives—might utilize
enhanced shareholder rights to engage in rent-seeking behavior. For
instance, a hedge fund might seek to use its shareholder leverage to engage
in 1980s-style “greenmail” tactics to extract side payments from company
management. 267 Alternatively, as recently demonstrated in High River
Limited Partnership v. Mylan Laboratories, Inc.,268 a fund might utilize
derivative transactions to acquire voting rights in a firm without any
concomitant economic interest. It can then exercise these voting rights in a
manner that advances the fund’s long position in another firm. 269
263
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Shareholders might seek to combat these types of inter-shareholder agency
problems, but as demonstrated in the VC context, such efforts will entail
agency costs of their own. 270
Ultimately, analysis of the full scope of agency problems in VC
investment returns us to the “generality of the agency problem” emphasized
by Jensen and Meckling almost thirty years ago.271 The agency problems
confronting investors are multiple and, as shown in the context of VC
investment, often inter-related. By focusing exclusively on one dimension
of agency risk—be it the agency risks with management in a public
corporation or the agency risk among shareholders in a private company—
we risk obscuring the full dimension of agency problems facing corporate
investment.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has used VC finance to introduce into corporate scholarship
an appreciation for the dynamic formation of agency problems among—
and within—a firm’s various stakeholder groups. VC scholarship—like
corporate scholarship in general—has long overlooked how investors can
face multiple dimensions of agency risk. As this Article has shown, the
techniques that VC investors use to minimize investor-manager conflicts
often create the potential for conflict among investors themselves. For
many companies such as FormFactor, success in developing a company’s
technology and business, combined with healthy market conditions, permit
these conflicts to remain primarily potential conflicts, hidden from
exposure. Even in these situations, however, the possibility of inter-investor
conflict fundamentally affects investment risk and defines the structure of
VC contracts in critical ways. And where an investment fails to conform to
these idealized conditions, Benchmark shows us how easily these potential
conflicts can turn into actual ones.
More generally, analysis of the dynamic relationship between investormanager and inter-investor agency risk in VC finance has broader
implications for corporate scholarship. This result can hardly be surprising.
The traditional model of the start-up company is a common starting point
for numerous paradigms of the firm and their associated theories of
corporate law. 272 By revealing the flaws of the traditional model of VC
Because Perry held a long-position in King, it used its Mylan voting power to advance the King
acquisition. High River Limited Partnership (High River), a hedge fund controlled by Carl Icahn, held a
large long-position in Mylan and a short-position in King in the expectation that the over-valued
transaction would collapse. High River initiated the suit to enjoin Perry from voting its Mylan shares to
approve the merger. See id. at 35-36.
270
Cf. id. at 18-19 (describing shareholder efforts to oppose rent-seeking as potentially creating
“squabbling costs” that are born by shareholders but “consume resources that have a positive opportunity
cost somewhere else in the economy simply in attempting to shuffle wealth among shareholders”).
271
Jensen & Meckling, supra note 8, at 309.
272
See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 12, at 275-76 (using hypothetical start-up company to demonstrate
team production model); G. Mitu Gulati, et. al., Connected Contracts, 47 UCLA L. REV. 887, 896
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investment, one might naturally expect paradigms of the firm that have been
constructed with it to appear all the more fragile. This conclusion seems
particularly appropriate for the “grand design principal agent paradigm”
that, like the traditional model of VC investment, concerns itself primarily
with the agency problems that exist between shareholders and managers.
The experience of the VC industry suggests that to appreciate fully the
scope of agency problems within a firm, one must contend with the multiple
dimensions in which these problems can exist and the dynamic manner in
which they interact. Analysis of the VC market suggests that rational
investors are well aware of these problems and the investment risks they
create. Corporate scholarship should be as well.

(2000) (using venture-backed start-up company to set forth a “connected contracts” model of
collaborative economic activity).

